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ABSTRACT
Analysis of Implementation and Application of Procedural Due
Process Required by Goss v. Lopez
by
Timothy D. Stephens
Dr. Gerald C. Kops, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Educational Eeadership
University o f Nevada, Eas Vegas
This dissertation examines the jurisprudence of student procedural due process
rights. Review o f the literature available prior to the recognition o f student due process
rights hy the Supreme Court in Goss v. Lopez (1975) was performed and subsequently
led to questions directly related to the emergence o f due process protections. A detailed
analysis of Goss v. Lopez (1975) identified student due process standards. Following the
decision, courts cited the precedent on nearly two thousand five hundred occasions.
Review of these citations yielded eighty-six cases relevant to analysis o f implementation
and application o f the Goss precedent. Finally, the patterns o f interruption and
application and unanswered questions were identified.
Since 1975 Federal Courts have been called upon to interpret and apply the Goss
precedent. This study investigates the implementation and application o f Goss by
Federal Courts. This study targeted student due process. In reviewing case law dealing
with the administration o f the Fourteenth Amendment, the study determined how the
various federal courts have interpreted and applied the Goss landmark over the past three
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decades. This study also reviewed Nevada Revises Statues and Clark County School
District Policy and Regulations to determine their consistency with Goss v. Lopez.
Special attention to cases in which school administrators were questioned with regard to
the application of due process during student discipline procedures was presented.
Finally, the study sought to identify patterns in the courts’ rulings that provide guidance
for today’s school administrators faced with student discipline issues.
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Just another old person out on the street. You would never take the time to say hi or
meet. They could be a small child or a grown up adult. They could be as innocent as
ever or at great fault. You may not recognize them or know they are there. But they are
a hero to someone somewhere. {Tori Lynn Stephens, 2004)
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Between February and March 1971, there was widespread student unrest in the
Columbus Public School System in Ohio. It was a turbulent time throughout the country
and the students in Columbus were riding the wave o f civil disobedience. The Vietnam
War had sparked riots throughout the country with many protesters o f the War
committing the same offenses they vocalized against. Tinker v. Des Moines School
District upheld the right of high school students to wear black armbands in protest to the
Vietnam War and, more importantly the right to engage in protest as long as it did not
materially or substantially disrupt learning in the school environment. Administrators
throughout the Country recognized student discipline as a problem. The discipline of
students as a result o f a high school disruption ultimately led to a determination of
constitutional implications of student discipline.
Six of the students were suspended from Marion-Franklin High School in
Columbus for ten-days for disruptive or disobedient conduct, which was committed in the
presence o f the school administrator. Tyrone Washington was demonstrating in the
school auditorium when he was directed hy the school principal to leave. Washington
refused to comply and was being physically escorted out o f the auditorium hy a police
officer when another student, Rudolph Sutton, attacked the officer. The principal
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immediately suspended Sutton, Washington, and four others. None o f the students were
given the opportunity to tell their side o f the story at the time o f their suspensions.
Also during that time, student unrest was also escalating at Central High School in
Columhus as well. Dwight Lopez was suspended for damaging school property in the
lunchroom during a disturbance. Lopez was among seventy-five students suspended
from Central High School that day; however, he later insisted he was simply an innocent
bystander rather than an active participant. Like the students at Marion-Franklin High
School, Lopez also did not receive an opportunity to state his side o f the story at the time
o f his suspension. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 734)
According to Ohio Rev. Code Section 3313.66 (1972), school administrators were
empowered to suspend an unruly student for ten days or expel a student for misconduct.
The administrator was required to notify the student’s parents within 24 hours and state
the reasons for his/her actions. There were, however, no provisions in the Rev. Code that
afforded any due process procedures for a student who was suspended. Ohio Law also
stated that children in the state were entitled to a free education between the ages o f six
and twenty-one. (Rev. Code Ann 3313.64, 1972)
Students challenged their discipline in the United States District Court for the
Southern District o f Ohio, Eastern Division (372 F. Supp. 1279). A three-judge District
Court panel overturned the disciplinary action finding the state law constitutionally
flawed because it failed to afford students due process. The panel then established a
three-pronged standard of due process. The first standard permitted the immediate
removal of a student whose conduct “disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school,
endangers fellow students, teachers, or school officials, or damages property.” Second,
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the District Court declared that there were “minimum requirements o f notice and a
hearing prior to suspension, except in emergency situation.” The District Court stated
that relevant case authority would “require notice o f suspension proceedings to he sent to
the student’s parents within 24 hours o f the decision. Third, the District Court required a
hearing of sorts, in which the student would he informed o f the charge and allowed to
respond to allegations / charges. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 735)”
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that “nor shall any state
deprive any person o f life, liberty, or property, without due process o f law ... (U.S.
Constitution, 14*'’ Amendment)” The school discipline obviously did not infringe a life
interest, however, the District Court reasoned that removal from school implicated a
property interest established by the Ohio Law providing that Ohio children were entitled
to an education. The panel also determined that removal from school implicated a liberty
interest because o f the record made o f such action. Specifically, the District Court held;
1. Students facing temporary suspension from a public school have
property and liberty interests that qualify for protection under the Due
Process Clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.
735)
(a) Having chosen to extend the right to an education to people of
appellees' class generally, Ohio may not withdraw that right on
grounds o f misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to
determine whether the misconduct has occurred, and must
recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as
a property interest that is protected hy the Due Process Clause, and
that may not he taken away for misconduct without observing
minimum procedures required hy that Clause. (Goss v. Lopez,
1975 P. 731)
(b) Since misconduct charges if sustained and recorded could
seriously damage the students' reputation as well as interfere with
later educational and employment opportunities, the State's
claimed right to determine unilaterally and without process
whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with
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the Due Process Clause's prohibition against arbitrary deprivation
of liberty. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 732)
(c) A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis and may
not be imposed in complete disregard of the Due Process Clause.
Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily
denied nor the liberty interest in reputation is so insubstantial that
suspensions may constitutionally he imposed by any procedure the
school chooses, no matter how arbitrary. tGoss v. Lopez. 1975 P.
732)
2. Due process requires, in connection with a suspension o f 10 days or
less, that the student he given oral or written notice o f the charges against
him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his version. Generally, notice and
hearing should precede the student's removal from school, since the
hearing may almost immediately follow the misconduct, but if prior notice
and hearing are not feasible, as where the student's presence endangers
persons or property or threatens disruption of the academic process, thus
justifying immediate removal from school, the necessary notice and
hearing should follow as soon as practicable. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 732)
Additionally, the District Court ruled;
“that there were "minimum requirements o f notice and a hearing prior to
suspension, except in emergency situations." In explication, the court stated that
relevant case authority would: (1) permit "[immediate] removal of a student
whose conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere o f the school, endangers fellow
students, teachers or school officials, or damages property"; (2) require notice o f
suspension proceedings to he sent to the student's parents within 24 hours o f the
decision to conduct them; and (3) require a hearing to be held, with the student
present, within 72 hours of his removal. Finally, the court stated that, with respect
to the nature o f the hearing, the relevant cases required that statements in support
of the charge be produced, that the student and others he permitted to make
statements in defense or mitigation, and that the school need not permit
attendance hy counsel. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 735)”
Various administrators o f the Columhus, Ohio, Public School System challenged
the judgment of the three-judge federal court by filing an appeal with the Supreme Court
of the United States. The Goss v. Lopez Court rejected the view that attendance at public
school was a privilege, allowing administrators to withdraw students at will, and further
rejected the notion that school authorities stand in loco parentis to the student and
thereby, have full parental discretion in matters of discipline. (Wilkinson III, 1975)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Justice White, writing for the majority noted that Ohio law provided for a free
education and also allowed for a principal o f an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for
misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing or to expel him. He also noted that the
statute required the principal to notify the parent within 24-hours o f their child’s removal
from school. A pupil or parent o f a pupil that is recommended for expulsion has the right
to appeal to the Board o f Education. The Board also had the right to reinstate such
student.
Justice White found that Columbus, Ohio Publie School System was devoid o f
any written procedure applicable to suspensions. Additionally, Justice White declared,
“[Mjany school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act
unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it would be a
strange disciplinary system in an educational institution if no communication was
sought hy the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him o f his
dereliction and to let him tell his side o f the story in order to make sure that an
injustice is not done. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.739)”
Even when the disciplinarian is the person who witnessed the misbehavior of the student,
which had necessitated the suspension. Justice White insisted that the student was still
entitled to notice and a hearing. “The student will at least have the opportunity to
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context. (Goss v. Lopez.
1975 P. 739)” The narrow, 5-4, decision fundamentally changed the procedure used hy
school administrators disciplining students. Specifically, the Supreme Court held;
“This appeal by various administrators of the Columhus, Ohio, Public School
System (CPSS) challenges the judgment of a three-judge federal court, declaring
that appellees —various high school students in the CPSS —were denied due
process of law contrary to the command of the Fourteenth Amendment in that
they were temporarily suspended from their high schools without a hearing either
prior to suspension or within a reasonable time thereafter, and enjoining the
administrators to remove all references to such suspensions from the students'
records. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 732)”
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“At the outset, appellants contend that because there is no constitutional right to
an education at public expense, the Due Process Clause does not protect against
expulsions from the public school system. This position misconceives the nature
o f the issue and is refuted by prior decisions. The Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the State to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. Protected interests in property are normally "not created hy the Constitution.
Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined" by an independent
source such as state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits. (Goss
V. Lopez, 1975, P. 735)”
“Here, on the basis of state law, appellees plainly had legitimate claims of
entitlement to a public education. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3313.48 and 3313.64
(1972 and Supp. 1973) direct local authorities to provide a free education to all
residents between five and 21 years of age, and a compulsory-attendance law
requires attendance for a school year o f not less than 32 weeks. (Goss v. Lopez,
1975, Pp. 735 - 736)”
“Although Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a
public school system, it has nevertheless done so and has required its children to
attend. Those young people do not "shed their constitutional rights" at the
schoolhouse door. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creatures —Boards o f Education not
excepted." W est Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637
(1943). The authority possessed hy the State to prescribe and enforce standards of
conduct in its schools although concededly very broad, must he exercised
consistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other things, the State is
constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as
a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may
not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures
required by that Clause. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975, P. 736)”
“The Due Process Clause also forbids arbitrary deprivations o f liberty. "Where a
person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the
government is doing to him," the minimal requirements o f the Clause must he
satisfied. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Board of
Regents v. Roth, supra, at 573. School authorities here suspended appellees from
school for periods of up to 10 days based on charges o f misconduct. If sustained
and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students' standing with
their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities
for higher education and employment. It is apparent that the claimed right of the
State to determine unilaterally and without process whether that misconduet has
occurred immediately collides with the requirements o f the Constitution. (Goss v.
Lonez. 1975, P. 736)”
“Appellants proceed to argue that even if there is a right to a public education
protected by the Due Process Clause generally, the Clause comes into play only
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when the State subjects a student to a "severe detriment or grievous loss." The
loss o f 10 days, it is said, is neither severe nor grievous and the Due Process
Clause is therefore of no relevance. Appellants' argument is again refuted by our
prior decisions; for in determining "whether due process requirements apply in the
first place, we must look not to the 'weight' hut to the nature o f the interest at
stake." Board o f Regents v. Roth, supra, at 570-571. Appellees were excluded
from school only temporarily, it is true, but the length and consequent severity of
a deprivation, while another faetor to weigh in determining the appropriate form
of hearing, "is not decisive o f the basic right" to a hearing o f some kind. Puentes
V. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972). The Court's view has been that as long as a
property deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question
whether account must be taken o f the Due Process Clause. Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Flarlan, J., concurring); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-379 (1971); Board o f Regents v. Roth, supra, at
570 n. 8. A 10-day suspension from school is not de minimis in our view and may
not be imposed in complete disregard o f the Due Process Clause. (Goss v. Lopez.
1975, Pp. 736 - 737)"
“A short suspension is, o f course, a far milder deprivation than expulsion. But,
"education is perhaps the most important function o f state and local
governments," Brown v. Board o f Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), and the
total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period, and
certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life o f the
suspended child. Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily
denied nor the liberty interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so
insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure
the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975, P. 737)”
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process
is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S., at 481. We turn to that question, fully
realizing as our cases regularly do that the interpretation and application o f the
Due Process Clause are intensely practical matters and that "[the] very nature of
due process negates any concept o f inflexible procedures universally applicable to
every imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. MeLlroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961). We are also mindful o f our own admonition:”
"Judicial interposition in the operation o f the public school system
o f the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . . By
and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the
control of state and local authorities. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975, P.
738)"
“There are certain benchmarks to guide us, however. Mullane v. Central Hanover
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), a ease often invoked hy later opinions, said that
"[many] controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words o f the Due
Process Clause but there can he no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property hy adjudication he preceded by notice and

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature o f the ease." Id., at 313. "The
fundamental requisite o f due process o f law is the opportunity to he heard,"
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914), a right that "has little reality or
worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for
him self whether to . . . contest." Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., supra, at
314. See also Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965); Anti-Fascist
Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168-169 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
eoncurring). At the very minimum, therefore, students facing suspension and the
consequent interference with a protected property interest must he given some
kind o f notice and afforded some kind o f hearing. "Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they
must first he notified. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975, P. 738)”
“It also appears from our cases that the timing and content o f the notice and the
nature o f the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing
interests involved. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, supra, at 895; Morrissey v.
Brewer, supra, at 481. The student's interest is to avoid unfair or mistaken
exclusion from the educational process, with all o f its unfortunate consequences.
The Due Process Clause will not shield him from suspensions properly imposed,
hut it disserves both his interest and the interest o f the State if his suspension is in
fact unwarranted. The concern would be mostly academic if the disciplinary
process were a totally accurate, unerring process, never mistaken and never
unfair. Unfortunately, that is not the case, and no one suggests that it is.
Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith, frequently act on the
reports and advice of others; and the controlling facts and the nature of the
conduct under challenge are often disputed. The risk o f error is not at all trivial,
and it should he guarded against if that may he done without prohibitive cost or
interference with the educational process. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975, Pp. 738 - 739)”
“The difficulty is that our schools are vast and complex. Some modicum of
discipline and order is essential if the educational function is to he performed.
Events calling for discipline are frequent occurrences and sometimes require
immediate, effective action. Suspension is considered not only to he a necessary
tool to maintain order hut a valuable educational device. The prospect of
imposing elaborate hearing requirements in every suspension case is viewed with
great concern, and many school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled
power to act unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it
would be a strange disciplinary system in an educational institution if no
communication was sought hy the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to
inform him o f his dereliction and to let him tell his side o f the story in order to
make sure that an injustice is not done. "[Fairness] can rarely he obtained by
secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive o f rights. . . . " "Secrecy is not
congenial to truth-seeking and self-righteousness gives too slender an assurance
of rightness. No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to
give a person in jeopardy o f serious loss notice o f the case against him and
opportunity to meet it. Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, supra, at 170, 171172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 739)”
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“We do not believe that school authorities must be totally free from notice and
hearing requirements if their schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency.
Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection o f
the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a
suspension o f 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side o f the story. The Clause
requires at least these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings
of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 739 740)”
“There need he no delay between the time "notice" is given and the time o f the
hearing. In the great majority o f cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss
the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold
only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this
discussion, the student first be told what he is accused o f doing and what the basis
of the accusation is. Lower courts which have addressed the question o f the nature
o f the procedures required in short suspension cases have reached the same
conclusion. Tate v. Board o f Education, 453 F.2d 975, 979 (CAS 1972); Vail v.
Board o f Education, 354 F.Supp. 592, 603 (NH 1973). Since the hearing may
occur almost immediately following the misconduct, it follows that as a general
rule notice and hearing should precede removal o f the student from school. We
agree with the District Court, however, that there are recurring situations in which
prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a
continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat o f disrupting the
academic process may he immediately removed from school. In such cases, the
necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable, as
the District Court indicated. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 740)”
“In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have imposed procedures on
school disciplinarians which are inappropriate in a classroom setting. Instead we
have imposed requirements, which are, if anything, less than a fair-minded school
principal would impose upon him self in order to avoid unfair suspensions. Indeed,
according to the testimony of the principal of Marion-Franklin High School, that
school had an informal procedure, remarkably similar to that which we now
require, applicable to suspensions generally but which was not followed in this
case. Similarly, according to the most recent memorandum applicable to the entire
CPSS, see n. 1, supra, school principals in the CPSS are now required hy local
rule to provide at least as much as the constitutional minimum which we have
described. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975, P. 740)”
“We stop short o f construing the Due Process Clause to require, countrywide, that
hearings in connection with short suspensions must afford the student the
opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses
supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify his version o f the
incident. Brief disciplinary suspensions are almost countless. To impose in each
such case even truncated trial-type procedures might well overwhelm
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administrative facilities in many places and, by diverting resources, cost more
than it would save in educational effectiveness. Moreover, further formalizing the
suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only
make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool hut also destroy its effectiveness
as part of the teaching process. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 740 - 741)”
“On the other hand, requiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the
student to give his version o f the events will provide a meaningful hedge against
erroneous action. At least the disciplinarian will he alerted to the existence o f
disputes about facts and arguments about cause and effect. He may then
determine himself to summon the accuser, permit cross-examination, and allow
the student to present his own witnesses. In more difficult cases, he may permit
counsel. In any event, his discretion will be more informed and we think the risk
of error substantially reduced. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 741)”
“Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and
disciplinarian, preferably prior to the suspension, will add little to the fact-finding
function where the disciplinarian him self has witnessed the conduct forming the
basis for the charge. But things are not always as they seem to be, and the student
will at least have the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he
deems the proper context. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 741)”
“We should also make it clear that we have addressed ourselves solely to the short
suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or expulsions for the
remainder o f the school term, or permanently, may require more formal
procedures. Nor do we put aside the possibility that in unusual situations,
although involving only a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary
procedures will he required. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 741)”
“The District Court found each o f the suspensions involved here to have occurred
without a hearing, either before or after the suspension, and that each suspension
was therefore invalid and the statute unconstitutional insofar as it permits such
suspensions without notice or hearing. Accordingly, the judgment is Affirmed.
(Goss V. Lopez. 1975 P. 741)”

Justice Powell wrote the dissenting opinion. He vocalized his concern that
schools should he run and governed by the experts, school officials. Justice Powell, with
whom The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, in his
dissenting opinion, warned, “no one can foresee the ultimate frontiers of the new ‘thicket’
the Court now enters.” “This potential ‘thicket’ o f micromanagement of the nation’s
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public schools by the Courts necessitated changes in school district’s policies and
regulations as well as laws governing the disciplining o f students in each state throughout
the country. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 741)” Justice Powell warned;
“The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that permits student suspensions
from school without a hearing “for not more than ten days.” The decision
unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the operation of our
public schools that may affect adversely the quality o f education. The Court
holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than educational officials and
state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applicable to routine
classroom discipline o f children and teenagers in the public schools. It justifies
this unprecedented intrusion into the process o f elementary and secondary
education by identifying a new constitutional right: the right of a student not to he
suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due process hearing
either before or promptly following the suspension. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.
741)”
Justice Powell continued hy stating,
’’The Court’s decision rests on the premise that, under Ohio law, education is a
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
and therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hearing. In my view, a
student’s interest in education is not infringed hy a suspension within the limited
period prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that there may he some
arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify
imposition o f a constitutional rule. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 742)”
School authorities were troubled hy the Court’s ruling. Specifically, could the
decision regarding the new requirement to provide notice and due process procedures
when suspending students he extended to include academic decisions, such as grade
promotion, or suspension from extra-curricular activities? Or, could its scope be
extended to include even more trivial disciplinary decisions such as giving a child
detention or In-House Suspension?
Thirty years have now passed since the Court’s ruling in Goss yet, no study has
examined the implementation and application o f the landmark decision. Since 1975,
Courts have rendered a variety of decisions citing Goss that both affirm the due process
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standard set forth in Goss, and determined its scope and impact on other issues unrelated
to student discipline in the educational setting.

Research Prohlem
This study examined how the Supreme Court and federal courts have interpreted
and applied the standard set forth in this landmark case. Additionally, the study analyzed
issues that have emerged since the landmark precedent. The study includes a review of
the Nevada Revised Statutes in addition to Clark County School District Policies and
Regulations. The focus of the review was to determine whether the Clark County School
District Policies and Regulations complied with the notice and due process standard set
forth in Goss v. Lopez. Finally, the study provides guidance to current and future
administrators with regard to the Goss v. Lopez decision/precedent.

Research Questions
In the course of surveying the literature related to Goss v. Lopez, reviewing
rulings in various federal courts— district, circuit, and Supreme— and analyzing the
Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County School District Policies and Regulations, the
study sought answers to the following research questions;
•

How have the Federal Courts interpreted and applied the due process standard set
forth in Goss v. Lopez?

•

What if any issues as to the meaning o f Goss v. Lopez have emerged since the
landmark precedent?

•

Have the Nevada Statutes heen revised to comply with the standard set forth in
Goss V. Lopez?

•

Have the Clark County School District Regulations and Policies heen aligned
with the Nevada Statutes and Goss v. Lopez?

12
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Based on jurisprudence o f Goss what should administrators do to comply with the
Goss V. Lopez decision/precedent?

Methodology Summary
“The purpose o f researching the law is to ascertain the legal consequenees o f a
specific set o f actual or potential facts” (Wren & Wren, 1986). In this study a specific
methodology was utilized. Review o f pertinent literature was performed. Specifically,
law reviews, books, periodicals, and journals were examined for their relevance with
regard to Goss v. Lopez and student procedural due process. Goss v. Lopez was
“Shepardized.” Shepardization o f the landmark case produced 2,492 federal court cases
that cited Goss. Lach o f the nearly 2,500 cases was examined. Specifically, all cases that
did not directly apply to public schools, students, and procedural due process were
discarded. Lighty-six cases were relevant to the study. Lach of the remaining eighty-six
eases were briefed, with respect to the following categories; case, procedural setting,
facts, holding, rationale o f holding, and if applicable the concurring and / or dissenting
opinions offered by the court.
The cases were studied for implementation and application patterns contained
therein. Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County School District Regulations and
Policies were scrutinized in order to determine if they adhered to the jurisprudence of
Goss. Finally, interpretation and application of Goss v. Lopez was utilized in order to
answer the research questions raised hy the review o f literature. This analysis of Goss v.
Lopez jurisprudence provided data regarding appropriate practice when dealing with
student discipline.
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Significance o f the Study
The purpose o f this dissertation was to examine jurisprudence of Goss v. Lopez
precedent regarding legal controversies over due process rights o f students in public
schools. The results o f the study are useful for school administrators throughout the State
of Nevada and elsewhere who are considering due process concerns when making
disciplinary and non-disciplinary decisions related to students.
In an age when school officials are frequently sued hy parents for making
unpopular disciplinary related decisions, this study will serve as a useful tool to ensure
the Fourteenth Amendment rights o f students are not violated. By referring to the study
when making difficult disciplinary decisions, a school principal may prevent a lawsuit hy
complying with precedents that have been established hy the courts. Finally, state
legislators and school hoard members may also refer to the study as a guide when
considering changes in law and/or policy in regard to complying with the due process
standard set forth in Goss v. Lopez.

Definitions of Terms
For the purpose o f this study, definitions provided by the courts are used when
possible, otherwise the default authority is Blacks Law (2000). The following definitions
of terms are provided:
Amendment: A formal revision or addition proposed or made to statute, constitution, or
other instrument (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 33).
Appeal: A proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered hy bringing it to a
higher authority; esp., the submission o f a lower court’s or agency’s decision to a higher
court for review and possible reversal (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 38).
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Bill o f Rights: A section or addendum, usu. In a constitution, defining the situations in
which a politically organized society will permit free, spontaneous, and individual
aetivity, and guaranteeing that governmental powers will not be used in certain ways;
esp., the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 69).
Brief: A written statement setting out the legal contentions of a party in litigation, esp.,
on appeal; a document prepared by counsel as the hasis for arguing a case, consisting of
legal and factual arguments and the authorities in support o f them (Blacks Law, 2000 P.

78^
Certiorari-. Gaining appellate review. An extraordinary writ issued hy an appellate court,
at its discretion, direeting a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review
(Blacks Law, 2000 P. 91).
Constitutional Rights: A right guaranteed by a constitution; esp., one guaranteed by the
U.S. Constitution or hy a state constitution (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 134).
Decision: a judicial determination after consideration o f the facts and the law; esp., a
ruling, order, or judgment pronounced hy a court when considering or disposing of a case
(Blacks Law, 2000 P. 178).
Due process: The conduct of legal proceedings according to established rules and
prineiples for the protection and enforcement o f private rights, ineluding notice and the
right to a fair hearing before a tribunal with the power to decide the case (Blaeks Law,
2000 P. 223).
En Banc: With all judges present and participating; in full court (Blacks Law, 2000 P.
223).
Equal Protection: The constitutional guarantee under the 14*'’ Amendment that the
government must treat a person or class o f persons the same as it treats other persons or
classes in like circumstances (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 240).
Fighting words: Inflammatory speech that might not he proteeted by the First
Amendment’s free speech guarantee because it might incite a violent response (Blacks
Law, 2000 P. 283).
In Loco Parentis: Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker o f a
ehild, taking on all or some of the responsihilities of a parent (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 351).
Procedural Due Process: The minimal requirements o f notice and a hearing guaranteed
by the Due Process Clauses of the 5*'’ and 14*'’ Amendments, esp., if the deprivation of a
significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 223).
Speech: The expression or communication of thoughts or opinions in spoken words;
something spoken or uttered (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 658).
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Student: Any person with respect to whom an educational agency or institution
maintains education records or personally identifiable information, but does not include a
person who has not been in attendance at such agency or institution (FERPA, 2000).
Substantive Due Process: The doctrine that the Due Process Clauses o f the 5"’ and 14*'’
amendments require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a
legitimate governmental objective (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 223).
Supreme Court: An appellate court existing in most states, usu. as the court o f last resort
(Blacks Law, 2000 P. 682).
U.S. Supreme Court: The court of last resort in the federal system, whose members are
appointed by the President and approved by the Senate (Blacks Law, 2000 P. 682).

Limitations and Delimitations
The following six limitations and delimitations should be considered when the
results of this study are reviewed. First, the case law examined in the study was limited
to reported decisions of actions brought in the federal courts. Even though the rights in
question are also guaranteed in many state constitutions, the ultimate authority in such
matters rests with the federal court system. Second, with the exception of the text of
Goss

V.

Lopez, which is located in Appendix A, the full text of the other reviewed court

decisions was not included within the study, instead appropriate citations and brief format
were utilized to examine the relevant case law. Therefore, this study relies in the skills of
the researcher to determine critical aspects of the relevance o f each case. Third, a cutoff
date o f December 31, 2003 was imposed on the inclusion o f completed and published
federal court cases in the study, because of the amount of material to be examined.
Fourth, because o f the sheer bulk o f cases citing Goss, only those involving public K-12
school students were examined. Some selected non-school / non-student cases were
referenced because of their relevance to the inquiries made by the study, and to their
having been cited in court opinions. Fifth, Goss v. Lopez is referenced by page number
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from Appendix A. Finally, the results o f the legislative review of the Nevada Revised
Statutes and the Clark County School District Policies and Regulations may not be
applicable to other states or school districts.

Summary
Goss

V.

Lopez established the basic framework for student procedural o f due

process that has been in place for almost thirty years. First, a student may be
immediately removed if his conduct “disrupts the academic atmosphere of the school,
endangers fellow students, teachers, or school officials, or damages property.” Second,
Goss requires issuance of notice o f the infraction which usually takes place in a pre
suspension conference with the student. Additionally, during that hearing the school
administrator must provide “statements in support o f the charge.” Third, the student must
be permitted to respond in defense or mitigation (Goss. 1975).
While a landmark decision, such as Goss v. Lopez, provides a standard that must
be implemented throughout the country, it is not written in stone and is subject to both
interpretation and application. Since 1975, Courts have rendered a variety o f decisions
that both affirm the due process standard set forth in Goss, and also define its scope and
impact on other issues related to student discipline.
This chapter has introduced the inquiry, the research problem, and the research
questions. It has also delineated the research methodology and provided a definition of
relevant terms, introduced the significance of the study, and outlined the limitations and
delimitations. Chapter 2 will review relevant literature.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
Chapter two provides an overview o f the law and literature in place before and
during the Goss v. Lopez litigation as well as scholarly commentary and a review of the
federal court system.
“Ever since antiquity, every society has had some concept o f due process. Due process is
tied to custom, which can vary even among regions or localities within a nation. Due
process generally refers to the regularity, fairness, equality, and degree o f justice in both
procedures and outcomes. Fairness is the idea of doing w hat’s best. It may not be
perfect, but it’s the good and decent thing to do. Not only does the outcome have to be
fair, but so does everything along the line such as evidence gathering and presentation
(Chemerinsky, 2000).”
Due process, that which comports the notion o f what is fair, right, and just, has been
evolving since the beginning o f time (Solesbee v. Balkcom. 1950). The oldest court
record (2500 B.C.) showed the Egyptian legal procedure included allegations of a claim,
denials by the other, and the requirement that the first party produce credible witnesses
who will make oath supporting him (Forkosch, 2003).
Around 2000 B.C., Mesopotamian legal records also showed similar procedures
by following the statement, “Neither shalt thou bear false witness against thy neighbor”
(Forkosch, 2003). Additionally, China detailed the provision o f “notice” around the same
time frame. The Roman Twelve Tables also required analogous notice and hearing.
Even into the eleventh century, procedural requirements were adhered to, as in the decree
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of Conrad II in 1037 that “no man shall be deprived o f life.. .but by the laws of the
empire and the judgment of his peers...” (Stubbs, 1908). Article 39 o f the Magna Carta
(June 15, 1215) and its subsequent interpretation clearly outlined procedures for due
process. The Magna Carta became a sacred text in England and famous as the precursor
of the phrase, “due process o f law,” first used by Edward 111 in a statute o f 1354
(Forkosch, 2003).
At the beginning of the modem period in France, the Declaration o f the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen {Droits de l ’homme et du citoyen) stated that “no man should be
accused, arrested, or held in confinement, except in cases determined by the law, and
according to the forms which it has prescribed” (Forkosch, 2003). The American
colonials modified the idea o f due process o f law in the documents preceding and
following the American Revolution. Due process law claimed as a right by the Congress
o f the Colonies held in New York in 1765. Similarly, the famous Declaration o f Rights
adopted by Virginia in 1776 guaranteed that “no man be deprived o f his liberty, except by
the law of the land, or the judgment o f his peers” (Forkosch, 2003).
In 1789 James Madison proposed the clause that eventually became part o f the
Fifth Amendment, that “No person shall.. .be deprived o f life, liberty, or property,
without due process o f law” (Forkosch, 2003). The Fourteenth Amendment was added in
1868. The Fourteenth Amendment included “No State shall,” to the phrase. Therefore,
as the Fifth Amendment limits federal government, the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
power of the state.
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Review o f the Law and Literature
The Washington Post noted, “It is estimated by the National Education
Association that at least 70,000 teachers are being assaulted every year by students and
that 15,000 have had personal property stolen or vandalized. In the school year 1972-73,
{large) numbers {o f students) were assaulted, beaten, stabbed, robbed or shot”
(Washington Post, 1975). A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, chaired
by Senator Birch Bayh, conducted the most extensive study on the subject o f student
violence for the school years 1970 - 71, 1971 - 7 2 , and 1972 - 73. It concluded:
“It is alarmingly apparent that student misbehavior and conflict within our school
system is no longer limited to a fistfight between individual students or an
occasional general disruption resulting from a specific incident. Instead our
schools are experiencing serious crimes o f a felonious nature including brutal
assaults on teachers and students, as well as rapes, extortions, burglaries, thefts
and an unprecedented wave of wanton destruction and vandalism. Moreover our
preliminary study of the situation has produced compelling evidence that this
level of violence and vandalism is reaching crisis proportions which seriously
threaten the ability of our educational system to carry out its primary function”
(Washington Post, 1975).
Student rights in public schools are not completely guaranteed by law; however, due to
many court precedents student rights have been established. Many other cases have
helped pave the road to how schools can discipline students.
Dixon

V.

Alabama State Board o f Education (1961) dealt with a black college

student that participated in a “sit-in” at a white lunch counter. The student was not given
notice nor was there a hearing regarding the alleged violations (San Diego Law Review,
1975). Subsequent decisions have extended Dixon to high school suspensions. Williams
V.

Dade Countv School Board (1971), Hobson v. Bailev (1970), and Vought v. Van

Buren Public Schools (1969), all proclaimed that students were arbitrarily suspended
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without the right to vocalize their side o f the story and without prior notice o f the
allegations. Prior to 1969, the federal courts had not faced a short suspension case.
Dixon and its progeny had established procedural guidelines only for long or indefinite
suspensions and expulsions, (Notre Dame Lawyer, 1974). Therefore, the Dixon Court set
forth the following five standards, which it felt would decrease the possibility of arbitrary
decisions and afford the student minimum due process protection;
1. Notice o f specific charges and grounds against the student.
2. A hearing, the nature o f which should vary depending upon the circumstances
of the particular case.
3. The student should be given the names o f the witnesses against him and an
oral or written report on the facts to which each witness testifies.
4. The student should be given the opportunity to present his own defense
against the charges.
5. If the hearing is not before the Board directly, the results and findings o f the
hearing should be presented in a report open to the student (Dixon v. Alabama
State Board of Education. 1961 P. 159).
A hearing should serve two functions. First, it should determine whether or not
the student in fact did commit the alleged act. Second, it must designate appropriate
discipline with regard to the degree o f the committed offense (San Diego Law Review,
1975). The student need not admit his wrongdoing for the fact-finding aspect of the
hearing to become less important. As when the court in Bett v. Board of Education. Citv
of Chicago (1972) stated: Since the student admitted setting false alarms (the misconduct
with which she was charged) the function o f procedural protection is insuring a fair and
reliable determination o f the retrospective factual question whether she in fact did it is not
essential (Bett v. Board of Education. Citv o f Chicago. 1972 P. 629).
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The 1969 federal decision, Baker v. Downey Citv Board o f Education, was the
first to directly confront a short suspension. Two students were placed on ten-day
suspensions, without notice or hearing, for distributing a student publication named Oink.
The Principal conferred with the students’ parents two days after the suspension had been
applied. The court held that this post-suspension conference satisfied due process
requirements. Baker failed to consider the possibility of procedures less demanding than
the Dixon safeguards but more protective than the perfunctory post-suspension parental
conference (Baker v. Downey Citv Board o f Education. 1969). Madera v. Board of
Education was cited for the proposition that due process procedures may vary according
to the circumstances and that the right to counsel does not apply to school disciplinary
hearings:
“Law and order in the classroom should be the responsibility of our respective
educational systems. The courts should not usurp this function and turn
disciplinary problems, involving suspensions, into criminal adversary proceedings
- which they definitely are not” (Madera v. Board o f Education. 1967 Pp. 788789).
The classical situation arises when the violation of rules takes place in front o f the
school official that maintains the authority and duty to discipline students. In this type o f
instance, a determination o f whether the student was involved in misconduct would be a
needless step in the disciplinary process. However, this is not the typical situation. More
often, the offense occurs in front o f other students, which requires investigation on the
part o f the administrator. Disciplinarians for the most part must seek out the student, in
order to obtain his side of the story and then render his decision on whether to suspend
the student or not. As was pointed out by the Court:
“Fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one sided determination o f the facts
decisive o f rights... No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth
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than to give a person in jeopardy o f serious loss notice o f the case against him and
opportunity to meet it” (Anti-Fascist Comm, v. M cG rath. 1931 P. 123).
In Farrell v. Joel, high school students were placed on fifteen-day suspensions
after participating in protests that revolved around prior school disciplinary actions. The
students were warned that their activity violated school rules and if they continued in the
protest they would be suspended. The facts surrounding the incident included; the
removals from school were later reduced to ten-day suspensions, and there was no
hearing prior to their dismissal. The court held that the circumstances surrounding the
suspensions did not require notice or a prior hearing. Since the students knew that their
conduct violated school rules, they had been previously warned, and a ten-day suspension
was classified as a minor disciplinary action similar to staying after school and extra
homework, which do not require formal procedures, the Court explained a prior hearing
would have served no purpose except to set a penalty (Farrell v. Joel. 1971 P. 163).
In addition, a student who has been arrested by a court agency does not fulfill the
student’s due process rights. Specifically, if a student is suspended after being arrested
on their way to school, the court system has the right to drop the charges, thereby,
removing the sole evidence against the student in question and thus violating the student's
due process rights. The accuracy of witnesses generally will raise issues, which can only
be adequately tested if the accused student has an opportunity to present their side of the
story (Strickland v. Inlow. 1973 P. 189).
Schools have tried to circumvent student due process rights by claiming that
student due process rights fail to recognize emergency situations that may arise. A
general principle o f procedural due process is that the need for quick action by the state in
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serious emergency situations will overcome the individual interest in procedural
protections (Board of Regents v. Roth. 1972 P. 577).
In Banks v. Board o f Public Instruction, the Fifth Circuit Court considered The
Dade County school regulation, which authorized a ten-day suspension without prior
hearing (Banks v. Board o f Public Instruction. 1970). Although the court discussed
Dixon, and decided that any and all suspensions required a hearing, it felt that in the
matter of short suspensions a prior hearing would disrupt learning. This conclusion was
reached through a discussion o f hypothetical classroom misconduct. The discussion
assumed extreme misconduct requiring immediate removal from school to maintain the
learning environment. However, the Court did not acknowledge that severe misconduct
justifies dispensing with a prior hearing even when normally required.
Banks avoided the primary question o f whether a prior hearing should be required
in non-emergency situations. Similar incomplete analysis was afforded in Dunn v. Tvler
Independent School District (1971, P. 530). Dunn was placed on a three-day suspension
for involvement in riotous activity. Although the suspension could have been sustained
on the act alone the court emphasized particular facts surrounding the incident.
Therefore, the applicability of the “emergency” exception was not explicitly recognized
(Dunn

V.

Tvler Independent School District. 1971). Another Fifth Circuit case. Black

Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams (1970), acknowledged the relation o f due process
protections to emergency situations (Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. Williams.
1970).
Black Students like Dixon considered a ten-day suspension to be substantial and
cited Pervis v. LaMarque. which reminded that minimal punishment and emergency
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situations are the only exceptions to a prior hearing requirement. Therefore, Black
Students is near the position that any suspension requires a prior hearing except in
emergency situations (Black Students ex rel. Shoemaker v. W illiams. 1970 P. 1215).
Determination as to whether due process applies to school discipline in
emergency situations has been questioned for years. In 1943, the Fourteenth Amendment
was applied to the States by protecting the citizen against the state itself and all o f its
creatures - Boards of Education not excepted (West Virginia Board o f Education v.
Barnette. 1943 P. 637).
Benchmarks such as Mulane v. Central Hanover Trust Co. (1950) have given
guidance as to what process is due. This particular case, often invoked by later opinions,
said that, “Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words o f the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation o f life, liberty or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature o f the case.” Due process is a right that “has little reality or
worth unless one is informed that the matter is pending and can choose for himself
whether to ... contest” (Mulane v. Central Hanover Trust Co.. 1950 P. 313).
Furthermore, “The fundamental requisite o f due process o f law is the opportunity to be
heard” (Grannis v. Ordean. 1914 P. 394).
The Due Process Clause also forbids random deprivations o f liberty. Satisfaction
o f the minimal requirements o f the Clause was mandated in Wisconsin v. Constantineau
(1971). “Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because
of what the government is doing to him,” (Wisconsin v. Constantineau. 1971 P. 437).
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The courts have also determined that the length and consequent severity o f a
deprivation “is not decisive o f the basic right” to a hearing o f some kind (Fuentes v.
Shevin. 1972 P. 86). “Education is perhaps the most important function o f state and local
government” (Brown v. Board o f Education. 1954 P. 493). Thus, exclusion from the
educational process is a serious event in the life o f a suspended child. The Court’s stance
has been that as long as a property deprivation occurs, its gravity is irrelevant to the
question o f whether due process should be afforded.
“Fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination o f facts
decisive o f rights...” “Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and selfrighteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness. No better instrument
has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in jeopardy o f serious
loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it” (Anti-Fascist
Committee. 1951 Pp. 168 - 172).
Three different constitutional models o f hearings have emerged under Supreme
Court decisions. The models diverge sharply in their procedural formalities:
1. Full dress due process. The accused has the right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury or judge, notice o f the charges, to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, to be present at trial, to retain counsel, protection against being
put twice in jeopardy and a standard of proof o f beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Medium due process. Some o f the more formal manifestations o f the criminal
trial, such as the jury, complex rules of evidence, and stricter standards o f proof
are absent. The right to cross-examine is accorded but the Court’s attitude toward
counsel is more ambivalent. Counsel need not be provided at the pre-termination
stage, but the accused must he allowed to retain counsel if so desired.
3. Skeletal due process. Rights to counsel and cross-examination are almost wholly
absent. Skeletal due process contains only the barest rudiments: advance notice
o f the charges, a statement of the evidence backing them, some chance to present
one’s own side of the story, and perhaps a brief statement o f reasons for the
adverse action (Wilkinson III. 1975).
According to the Fourteenth Amendment, “No state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” When a school administrator
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disciplines a student as a result of misconduct, the school official is exercising “state”
action, while the student would be the “person” being deprived o f liberty and/or property.
Deprivation o f life is reserved to the criminal justice process and by government action
and therefore is not relevant to this issue. According to William Buss, of the University
of Iowa Law School, the due process clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment
poses three distinct procedural due process issues:
(1) Is the claimant before the court entitled to any constitutionally
required process at all?
(2) If the claimant is entitled to any “due process,” when is that
process due?
(3) At whatever time or times the constitutional protection attaches, what
procedural safeguards does due process in fact require— what process is due?
(Buss, William G., 1975)
If the individual deprivation is not o f “life, liberty, or property,” the individual has
no constitutional right to any form o f due process protection; if the interest is protected,
some form o f prior hearing is required” (Arnett v. Kennedy, 1974 P. 1650).
In Lopez v. Williams a number o f students were suspended from the Columbus,
Ohio, public schools after being involved in a student demonstration during a time o f
racial tension in early 1971. The facts established that at least some o f the students were
suspended without any form o f hearing. The students gave testimony that they did not
participate in the demonstration/misconduct and were subsequently suspended by
administration. The suspensions were imposed under an Ohio statue, which authorized
principals to impose suspensions up to ten-days without prior notice and hearing (Lopez
V.

Williams. 1974 P. 1299).
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The students claimed that they were denied their due process rights and filed suit
against the district. A three judge panel utilized the Supreme Court two-phase approach
and held that the statutory right to public education is a protected liberty requiring prior
hearing before deprivation thus, invalidating the Ohio statute. The Court weighed the
interest of school authorities in regulating discipline and declined to outline/specify a
precise form o f hearing;
“If school administrators follow procedures, which result in a fair factual
determination made after notice and an opportunity to defend against the charges
of misconduct, then no matter how informal the procedure, the student has been
accorded (due process)...” (Lopez v. W illiams, 1974 P. 1291).
The decision also noted that students who committed serious disruptions could be
suspended without a prior hearing. It was also documented that when such situations
occur, an adversary hearing should be held within 72 hours after the infraction.
In opinions handed down in 1972, including Roth v. Board o f Regents (1972), the
Supreme Court developed a new approaeh to procedural due process cases (DuPriest,
Douglas M, 1977). It established a two-part analysis, determining first whether property
or liberty interest was involved in the dispute. If such interests were involved the Court
would decide how it should be protected. In Roth, the Court indicated that due process
protections couldn’t be invoked to protect a right guaranteed by one o f the first eight
amendments without an accompanying finding that a liberty or property interest is
involved (Roth v. Board o f Regents. 1972 P. 577).
However, the nature and weight o f the accused interests must be taken into
consideration when establishing whether or not due process is required. The factors
appropriate at one stage are intended to be exclusive o f those at the other stage. In
Morrissev v. Brewer the Court used a two-part test that considered both the nature and
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the weight o f the interest in determining whether a protected right existed. This approach
is more tenable than that espoused in R oth. It is impossible to wholly separate values of
quality and quantity. “Some valuing is inevitably necessary to determine if a particular
limitation of freedom rises to the level o f a fourteenth amendment deprivation o f liberty”
(Notre Dame Law. 1975).
The Supreme Court’s analytical framework was first applied to public school
suspensions in Vail v. Board o f Education, when Vail held that access to education itself
is a protected property interest. Any suspension greater than five days required the
safeguards established in Dixon. Vail with the possible exception o f Black Students, is
the furthest extension o f Dixon to short suspensions, by complying with the dictates o f
Roth, which mandates some form o f hearing before any suspension (Vail v. Board of
Education. 1973).
The “informal administrative consultation” allows for satisfaction o f due process
by requiring in order that:
“ .. .the student can know why he is being disciplined and so that the student can
have the opportunity to persuade the school official that the suspension is not
justified, e.g., that this is a situation o f mistaken identity or that there is some
other compelling reason not to take action” (Vail v. Board o f Education. 1973 P.
603).
Several Supreme Court cases have determined that public education is a
guaranteed “liberty.” Eighty years ago the Court held that liberty, “includes... not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right o f the individual ... to acquire
useful knowledge ...” (Mever v. Nebraska. 1923 P. 399). A few years later in Pierce v.
Societv o f Sisters the Court reaffirmed by stating that, “the liberty o f parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control” is
protected by due process (Pierce v. Societv of Sisters. 1928 Pp. 534 - 535).
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Therefore, the Court supported Lopez on the constitutional status o f public
education, but could not support on the hold that only long and not short suspensions
from school are protected interests. In Fuentes v. Shevin it was held that, “While the
length and consequent severity o f a deprivation may be another factor to weigh in
determining the appropriate form o f hearing, it is not decisive o f the basic right to a prior
hearing of some kind” (Fuentes v. Shevin, 1972 P. 86).
In Lopez v. Williams (1974) it was concluded that “W eight” only pertains to the
first-phase analysis o f any incident. The valuing o f a liberty after the misconduct has
been determined is to decide if it deserves fourteenth amendment status. As Judge
Kinneary stated:
“If education is a protected liberty when expulsion is involved, then it remains a
liberty when suspension occurs. The right to an education is the interest being
afforded procedural protection. It either is, or is not a liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The difference between expulsion and suspension becomes
important only when the Court confronts the question o f what process is due to
protect the Fourteenth Amendment liberty” (Lopez v. W illiams. 1974 P. 1300).
Student interest in being suspended has been argued throughout the years.
Society clearly places high value on education as indicated by the compulsory attendance
laws. The interest o f the student is to avoid the harm that could occur from being
excluded from school. In Shanlev v. Northeast Independent School Dist.. it was held
that:
“The ‘magnitude’ o f a penalty should be gauged by its effect upon the student and
not simply meted out by formula. For example, a suspension o f even one hour
could be quite critical to an individual student if that hour encompassed a final
examination that provided for no ‘make-up” (Shanlev v. Northeast Independent
School Dist.. 1972 P. 967).
Others have argued that the collateral damage to the student is more significant than the
academic harm. Suspensions generally become part o f a student’s permanent records and
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may effect their admission into higher learning or their employment in the future.
Furthermore, suspensions may also cause psychological harm from the stigmatization o f
a school suspension as indicated in Lopez when psychologists testified that, “suspensions
cause lowered self-esteem, resentment o f school authorities, and withdrawal” (Lopez v.
Williams, 1974).
In Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District, the Court indicated that;
“Suspension is a particularly humiliating punishment evoking images of the
public penitent of medieval Christendom and colonial Massachusetts, the outlaw
of the American West, and the ostracized citizen of classical Athens. Suspension
is an officially-sanctioned judgment that a student be for some period removed
beyond the pale” (Sullivan v. Houston Independent School District. 1971 P.
1172).

Banks v. Board of Public Instruction elaborated on the discussion o f classroom
misconduct and prior hearings. The court held that; “If student misconduct is so severe
that learning can be maintained only by immediate removal from school, extreme
physical violence for instance, a prior hearing is dispensable even if normally required”
(Banks v. Board o f Public Instruction. 1970 P. 296). Classroom misconduct is generally
not as bad as Banks assumed and very seldom does it require the instantaneous removal
of a student from school. Generally, when a student misbehaves in class and does not
respond to the teacher’s interventions the student is sent to an administrative office. The
administrator will then take into account prior incidents and the severity o f the incident at
hand. A suspension may occur, however, the administrator has the chance to have the
student understand that the suspension has been judiciously imposed. By means of this
type of informal due process the student is less likely to suffer psychological harm and
more likely to reevaluate his conduct (O ’Toole, 1972).
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The Court’s phrase “ongoing threat o f disrupting the academic process,” has also
been scrutinized. The problem is that not all administrators or teachers view similar
behaviors as being dismptive in nature. In Hawkins v. Coleman, students alleged that the
school’s suspension policy was being administered in a racially discriminatory manner.
Two experts testified and one found that the ethnicity o f black students was the sole
reason that students were being suspended. Specifically he stated, “There was a
substantial reliance upon non-violent “offenses” as a justification for suspension when, in
fact, such conduct may be a pivotal ethnic characteristic” (Hawkins v. Coleman. 1974 P.
1335). The second expert concluded that in schools where there is institutional racism
toward Blacks:
“Conduct by black students that would not be “unusual” or “offensive” in a black
environment becomes to many teachers as being “disruptive” or suspendable
conduct.” To teachers with Blacks, this conduct, that is non-violent and
characteristic of the black race, stands out and becomes thereby subject to
selective prosecution (Hawkins v. Coleman. 1974 P. 1336).
The qualification o f any incident being deemed as an “ongoing threat” is dependent on
the view of the teacher and the administration and therefore is susceptible to the same
kind o f judicial reasoning as “continuing danger” (Hawkins v. Coleman. 1974 P. 1336).

Brief o f Goss v. Lopez
Case
Goss

V.

Lopez. 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975)
Procedural Setting

U.S. Supreme Court
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Facts
In Ohio, during the early 1970’s, the state’s compulsory attendance law required
children to attend school and established education as a right for all students within the
appropriate age range. This provided the basis for the plaintiffs in Goss to argue that they
had been deprived o f their property interest, which was guaranteed by state law, o f an
education. Ohio law also allowed students to be suspended up to ten days without any
procedural safeguards.
The storm o f student protest movements was clearly gaining speed in the 1960’s
and during the ’Vietnam War on college campuses. By the early 1970’s the widespread
student unrest had spread to many high schools. Nine students alleged that they were
suspended from school for up to 10 days without a hearing (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 Pp. 730
-7 3 1 ).

Six o f the plaintiffs, Rudolph Sutton, Susan Cooper, Deborah Fox, Tyrone
Washington, Bruce Harris, and Clarence Byars, were students at the Marion-Franklin
High School. These six students were suspended for disruptive and disobedient conduct
committed in the presence o f the school administrator who ordered the suspension.
Specifically, Tyrone Washington began to demonstrate in the school auditorium while a
class was being conducted. The school principal directed him to leave. Washington
refused and was subsequently suspended. As a police officer was trying to remove
Washington, Rudolph Sutton physically attacked the police officer in front o f the
Principal and was also suspended (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 732).
Around the same time, Dwight Lopez, Betty Crome and seventy-five other public
school students were suspended from school in Columbus, Ohio. It was reported that the
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students caused a disturbance and then destroyed school property at Central High School.
Dwight Lopez contended that he did not participate in the disruption. Many of the
students did not participate in the protest but were nonetheless suspended for being
present at the demonstration. The suspended students did not receive hearings before
their suspensions were imposed, though some o f the students and their parents met in
informal conferences with school officials at a later date. (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.733)
Betty Crome was at a demonstration at a school other than her own. She was
arrested, taken to the police station, and then released without being charged. Crome
received a notice of suspension the following day. School administrators did not testify
in front of the Court with respect to the Lopez and Crome suspensions. Therefore, the
record did not show why the decision to suspend was made. It was clear that no hearing
was ever held for either student (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 733).
Carl Smith, the ninth named plaintiff, was also suspended in a similar fashion.
His disciplinary file did not contain information with regard to his suspension.
Furthermore, school officials did not testify as to the reason for the suspension.
Holding
District Court
The District Court found in favor o f the Plaintiffs.
Supreme Court
The Supreme Court also found in favor o f the Plaintiffs, however, the Supreme Court
removed various restrictions, such as timelines, created by the District Court.
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Rationale of Holding
District Court
Students challenged their discipline in the United States District Court for the
Southern District o f Ohio, Eastern Division (372 F. Supp. 1279). In the District Court’s
decision, a three-judge panel overturned the disciplinary action and established a three
pronged standard o f due process. The first requirement, according to the District Court,
only permitted the immediate removal o f a student whose conduct “disrupts the academic
atmosphere of the school, endangers fellow students, teachers, or school officials, or
damages property.” The District Court declared that there were “minimum requirements
of notice and a hearing prior to suspension, except in an emergency situation.” The
District Court stated that relevant case authority would:
“(1) permit immediate removal of a student whose conduct disrupts the academic
atmosphere o f the school, endangers fellow students, teachers or school officials,
or damages property; (2) require notice o f suspension proceedings to be sent to
the student's parents within 24 hours o f the decision to conduct them; and (3)
require a hearing to be held, with the student present, within 72 hours of his
removal.” Finally, the Court stated that, “during the required hearing, the school
administrator must provide ‘statements in support o f the charge,’ and, “the student
and others be permitted to make statements in defense or mitigation” (Goss v.
Lopez. 1975 P. 735).
The decision o f the court was based upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s
constitutional guarantee o f due process rights. According to the Fourteenth Amendment,
“nor shall any state deprive any person o f life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws” (U.S.
Constitution, 14*'’ Amendment). Finally, the District Court held that in some instances in
which prior notice and hearing were not feasible and the immediately removed student
should be given necessary notice o f hearing as soon as practicable. Subsequently, the
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District Court judges ordered that all references to the suspensions be removed from all
o f the Plaintiffs’ records.
The Supreme Court
Various administrators o f the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System challenged
the judgment of the three-judge federal court by filing a petition of certiorari with the
Supreme Court. The petition for certiorari was granted and the Court scheduled oral
arguments to begin on October 14, 1974. The main arguments raised by various
administrators of the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System included;
1. Attendance at public school was a privilege.
2. Administrators could withdraw students at will.
3. School Authorities stand in loco parentis to the student and thereby, have full
parental discretion in matters o f discipline (Oral Arguments, 1971).
The Supreme Court decided that the students in Goss had been deprived o f their
property interest o f an education and their liberty interest had also been impacted due to
the damage to their reputations by having a suspension placed in their school records and
their potential standing with future teachers. Once this was decided, the Court set about
determining what level of due process a student who may be subjected to disciplinary
action by a school administrator deserves. The Court handed down its decision January
o f 1975 that students facing suspension, “Must be given some kind o f notice and afforded
some kind of hearing,” before being deprived o f their education (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P.
738).

The decision o f the Court established that due process was due; however, the
amount o f due process for students determined by the Court was limited. Goss focused
on the distinction between fundamental rights and due process liberties. Goss concluded
that Rodriguez does not control the first-phase analysis. Rodriguez endorsed the
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statement in Brown v. Board o f Education (1954) that, “education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments” (San Antonio Independent School
Dist. V. Rodriguez, 1973). Therefore, denying due process protection in public education
cannot be justified when concerted with less elevated interests (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P.
737).
The Goss Court failed to specify the mildest form o f suspension that would
invoke due process and only generally described the type o f notice and hearing required.
While this deliberate redaction of specificity should not cause many problems, the
Court’s statement o f the situations where immediate removal without prior notice and
hearing could be troublesome. Although Goss did state that in cases o f immediate
suspension, a hearing should follow “as soon as practicable.”
According to the Goss decision, school administrators are required to give a
student notice o f the accusation made against him/her and the student must be provided
an opportunity to respond and give the disciplinarian their own version of the events
which may have occurred. The Court stopped short o f allowing a formal hearing with the
cross-examination of witnesses due to the logistical intrusion this would create on the
normal operation o f schools (Goss v. Lopez. 1975 P. 741).
The school also has an interest in student suspensions. School administrators, are
mandated to maintain the educational atmosphere in the schools. Therefore,
administrators require broad authority to control student conduct and have an interest in
avoiding restrictions, which could hamper their ability to respond to varying disciplinary
problems. The courts felt that if the procedures outlined in Dixon were to be followed for
all suspensions, the procedures themselves would be more disruptive than the incidents.
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Therefore, Vail required administrative consultation in an informal manner for
suspensions shorter than six days (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 740).
The Court then referred to Wood v. Strickland (1975), which dictated, “that the
plaintiff must have a ‘specific’ property interest in interscholastic high school
competition.” Since Goss spoke o f a “total exclusion from the educational process,” and
while the Court conceded that interscholastic athletics could be a benefit of education, the
Court decided that a property interest was created only in “participation in the entire
process” (Dallam v. Cumberland Valiev School District, 1975 P. 361). Education is
formulated on the basis that all activities culminate into the educational process.
Dissenting/Concurring Opinions
Maioritv Opinion
According to Justice White, who wrote the majority opinion, Ohio law provided
for a free education and also allowed for a principal o f an Ohio public school to suspend
a pupil for misconduct for up to 10 days without a hearing or to expel him. Furthermore,
the principal must notify the parent within 24-hours o f the removal from school. A pupil
or parent o f a pupil that is recommended for expulsion has the right to appeal to the
Board of Education. The Board also had the right to reinstate such student. Justice
White noted that Columbus, Ohio Public School System was devoid o f any written
procedure applicable to suspensions. Additionally, Justice White declared,
“[MJany school authorities may well prefer the untrammeled power to act
unilaterally, unhampered by rules about notice and hearing. But it would be a
strange disciplinary system in an educational institution if no communication was
sought by the disciplinarian with the student in an effort to inform him of his
dereliction and to let him tell his side of the story in order to make sure that an
injustice is not done. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 739)”
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Even when the disciplinarian is the person who witnessed the misbehavior o f the student,
which had necessitated the suspension, Justice White insisted that the student was still
entitled to notice and a hearing. “The student will at least have the opportunity to
characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context” (Goss v. Eopez,
1975 P. 739).
Dissenting Opinion
Although five of the Justices concurred with the Plaintiffs, Justice Powell, who
wrote the dissenting opinion, vocalized his concern that schools should be run and
governed by the experts, school officials. Justice Powell, with whom The Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined, in his dissenting opinion,
warned, “no one can foresee the ultimate frontiers o f the new ‘thicket’ the Court now
enters.”
This potential ‘thicket’ o f micromanagement of the nation’s public schools by the
Courts necessitated changes in school district’s policies and regulations as well as laws
governing the disciplining of students in each state throughout the country. Justice
Powell offered the following as part o f his dissent;
“The Court today invalidates an Ohio statute that permits student suspensions
from school without a hearing “for not more than ten days.” The decision
unnecessarily opens avenues for judicial intervention in the operation o f our
public schools that may affect adversely the quality o f education. The Court
holds for the first time that the federal courts, rather than educational officials and
state legislatures, have the authority to determine the rules applicable to routine
classroom discipline o f children and teenagers in the public schools. It justifies
this unprecedented intrusion into the process of elementary and secondary
education by identifying a new constitutional right: the right o f a student not to be
suspended for as much as a single day without notice and a due process hearing
either before or promptly following the suspension. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 741)”
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Justice Powell continued by stating,
’’The C ourt’s decision rests on the premise that, under Ohio law, education is a
property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
and therefore that any suspension requires notice and a hearing. In my view, a
student’s interest in education is not infringed by a suspension within the limited
period prescribed by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that there may be some
arguable infringement, it is too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify
imposition of a constitutional rule. (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 742)”
Justice Pow ell’s dissent followed the two-step analysis o f Roth. Powell
emphasized that property interests “are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law”
(Board of Regents v. Roth, 1972). Furthermore, since the Ohio statue which created the
student’s property right also defined its limitations by giving the principal power to
suspend students.
Therefore, Ohio legislature had made the student’s right and the principal’s right
inseparable. Additionally, to ignore the limitation placed upon the student’s right was to
disregard the clear intent o f the legislature. Finally, Justice Powell declared that a tenday suspension hardly constituted a “grievous loss.” Since the appellees’ grades had not
suffered from the ten-day suspensions, there was no serious deprivation o f the students’
entitlement to education (Goss v. Lopez, 1975 P. 742).
Scholarlv Commentary
Various administrators o f the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System challenged
the judgment o f the three-judge federal court by filing an appeal with the Supreme Curt
o f the United States. The Goss v. Lopez Court rejected the view that attendance at public
school was a privilege, the policy that administrators could withdraw students at will, and
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the notion that school authorities stand in loco parentis to the student and thereby, have
full parental discretion in matters o f discipline (Wilkinson III, 1975).
The arguments in the judicial process that influenced the United States Supreme
Court’s decision involved the type o f deprivations that incurred, specifically, short term
suspensions and suspensions that occurred when the administrator saw the incident and
did not allow the perpetrator to tell his side o f the story. If the individual deprivation is
not o f “life, liberty, or property,” the individual has no constitutional right to any form o f
due process protection. “If the interest is protected, then some form o f prior hearing is
required” (Arnett v. Kennedv. 1974 P. 1650). In Ohio, during the early 1970’s, the
state’s compulsory attendance law required ehildren to attend school and established
education as a right for all students within the appropriate age range. This provided the
basis for the plaintiffs in Goss to argue that they had been deprived o f their property
interest, which was guaranteed by state law, o f an education. Ohio law also allowed
students to be suspended up to ten days without any procedural safeguards.
The narrow, 5-4, decision fundamentally changed the way school administrators
were able to discipline students. It also presented a significant change that needed to be
made among school administrators regarding their perceptions o f the constitutional rights
o f students while at school as the ruling to expunge the Plaintiffs’ records reflected.
Furthermore, the Court held that students facing suspension, “Must be given some kind
o f notice and afforded some kind of hearing,” before being deprived o f their education
(Ruetter, Edmund E. JR., 1982). Therefore, since property interest could not he
established, the plaintiffs rights were not violated and the case was subsequently
dismissed. If argument had been made where the plaintive disputed his liberty interest by
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making a case that showed the denial o f a year o f interscholastic athletics affected his
opportunity to attend college or damaged his self-esteem, then the student may have
prevailed.

Outline o f Law
Case Law
“The purpose o f researching the law is to ascertain the legal eonsequences of a
specific set of actual or potential facts” (Wren & Wren, 1986). The legal system of the
United States is based upon the common law o f England. Common law is based on a
system of rights and most of the law is created by judges. As the law grows, courts are
faced with interpreting laws by applying them to specific circumstances. Accordingly, in
some instances the courts may modify the jurisprudence. Rights are an abstract concept
which may provide to be very confusing however, the basic idea is straightforward.
Rights are thought o f as domains in which people may act freely without harassment
from other individuals with differing opinions (Federal Judiciary, 2002).

Court System
The court system in the United States is comprised o f a variety o f courts
throughout the land. Specifically, each o f the states and territories operates as an
independent entity. Thus each state has different court structures and laws. Above all of
these courts sits the federal government, which also has its own laws and courts. A
further complication is that the courts often overlap and parties have the choice as to
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which court to file their dispute in. Federal courts are often called upon to apply state law
and state courts similarly must apply federal law (Federal Judiciary, 2002).
There are two types of courts in the United States. The Trial Courts consider
evidence, listen to testimony, and decide facts. After the Trial Court has made a decision,
the losing party may be able to appeal the decision to an Appeals Court. In an Appeals
Court, one party presents arguments supporting the decision o f the Trial Court while the
other party makes an argument asking the court to change the previous decision. Most
cases are not granted the opportunity to an appeal. Usually, an appeal is only possible
when there is a claim that the Trial Court has committed an error o f law. Error o f law
occurs when the judge makes a mistake as the law applicable in the case. An example of
error o f law is when the judge gives the wrong instructions to the jury or permits
evidence that should not have been allowed. W hen an Appeals Court issues a ruling, the
opinion of the court sets a precedent for similar cases in the future. However, a court in
another area or a higher court can disagree with the previously set precedent (Arbetman,
1990).

Federal Courts

"The United States district courts are the trial courts o f the federal court system.
Within limits set by Congress and the Constitution, the district courts have jurisdiction to
hear nearly all categories of federal cases, including hoth civil and criminal matters.
There are 94 federal judicial districts, including at least one district in each state, the
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Three territories o f the United States —the Virgin
Islands, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands —have district courts that hear federal
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cases, including bankruptcy cases” (Federal Judiciary, 2002). District courts are divided
into eleven separate sections throughout the United States and its territories.
“The 94 U.S. judicial districts are organized into 12 regional circuits, each of
which has a United States court of appeals. A court of appeals hears appeals from the
district courts located within its circuit, as well as appeals from decisions o f federal
administrative agencies. In addition, the Court o f Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
nationwide jurisdiction to hear appeals in specialized cases, such as those involving
patent laws and cases decided by the Court o f International Trade and the Court of
Federal Claims” (Federal Judiciary, 2002). Appeal courts are very different from the
district courts. The primary purpose o f an appeal court is to correct legal mistakes, not
rehear the facts. As a result the appeal courts main function is to rule on mistakes made
by the judges regarding the law (Federal Judiciary, 2002).

United States Courts o f Appeals and District Courts Geographic Boundaries
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The highest court o f the land is the Supreme Court. “The United States Supreme
Court consists o f the Chief Justice of the United States and eight associate justices. At its
discretion, and within certain guidelines established by Congress, the Supreme Court
each year hears a limited number o f the cases it is asked to decide. Those cases may
begin in the federal or state courts, and they usually involve important questions about
the Constitution or federal law” (Federal Judiciary, 2002). The Supreme Court hears
very few cases compared to the lower courts. Furthermore, the United States Supreme
Court may hear disputes from either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court plays an important role in shaping our laws and protecting our rights.
Under American political theory of judicial review, the Supreme Court has the power to
interpret laws passed by legislature and declare them null and void if it finds that those
laws created conflict with State or Federal Constitution. Therefore, many of the cases
decided by the Supreme Court are far more important to society than the individual
matter being litigated (Federal Judiciary, 2002).
Nine justices hear and decide all cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and a
majority rules. When all of the judges cannot agree on a decision, two or more written
opinions may be issued. The majority opinion states the decision o f the court while the
dissenting opinion states the reasons for the disagreement. Furthermore, judges agreeing
with the decision, but for a different reason, may write a concurring opinion (Arbetman,
1990). A decision made in the Supreme Court is considered final and binding with no
other avenue o f appeal once a decision is rendered. This study focused on federal law in
the various federal District Courts, Appeal Courts, and Supreme Court.
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Federal and State Court Systems
U.S.
Supreme Court
Appeals

Appeals

State Supreme Court
(Highest State Court)

U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals

Appeals
Intermediate Court of
Appeals (Some States)

Appeals

Appeals
Municipal or County
Court (Local Trials)

U.S. District Court
(Federal Trials)

Local Cases

Federal Cases

Summary
In its landmark Goss v. Lopez decision, the Supreme Court established that
students are entitled to due process procedural safeguards when facing a suspension from
school. Chapter two outlined the jurisprudence that preceded Goss v. Lopez. An
overview of the law and literature in place before and during the Goss litigation was
provided. Additionally, Goss v. Lopez was analyzed and briefed. Specifically, the facts,
holding, and rationale of the holding were presented. Furthermore, Justice W hite’s
opinion and the dissenting opinion, written by Justice Powell, were examined. Finally,
scholarly commentary and an outline o f the Federal Court System were offered. Chapter
Three will present the research design and methodology utilized in this study.
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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
Chapter three is a description o f the research design and methodology
incorporated into this work, thereby outlining a review o f implementation and application
of procedural due process required by Goss v. Lopez. Specifically, chapter three outlines
the method in which data was collected, disaggregated, and prepared for application to
several questions relating to public school education and due process rights.

Briefing

the cases was the main technique utilized for gathering information in this study.
“Briefing cases can serve as an important analytical tool, especially for beginning legal
researchers (Wren & Wren, 1986).” “The art of taking notes on court decisions has been
refined over the years into a widely accepted technique, called ‘briefing,’ which serves
both as an efficient means of recording notes and as an additional analytical tool (Wren &
Wren, 1986).” Furthermore, the purpose of this study was to investigate due process law
by analyzing all Federal Case Law subsequent to Goss v. Lopez, Nevada Revised Statues,
and Clark County School District Policies and Regulations as they pertain to public
school students.
Methodology
In this study a specific methodology was utilized. The study conducted was a
qualitative analysis o f the impact o f the Goss v. Lopez decision. The study included a
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comprehensive survey o f the related literature, a review o f rulings from the various
federal courts— district, circuit, and supreme— as well as an analysis o f the Nevada
Revised Statutes and the Clark County School District Policies and Regulations. The
cases were studied for patterns contained therein. Those patterns were examined for
application and interpretation with regard to Goss v. Lopez. When applicable to Goss the
page numbers quoted from Goss refer to the associated pages in Appendix A. Nevada
Revised Statutes and Clark County School District Regulations and Policies were
scrutinized in order to determine if they adhered to the jurisprudence o f Goss. Finally,
interpretation and application o f Goss v. Lopez was administered in order to answer the
research questions raised by the review o f literature.
Examination o f the Clark County Law Library and U N LV ’s William S. Boyd
Law School’s library, indexes of legal periodicals, revealed many sources for the
literature review. Case law and law journal databases on the Lexis service at the School
of Business at the University o f Nevada, Las Vegas was utilized to provide additional
information. On-line journals, journal articles available through the Educational
Resources Information Center (ERIC), W est’s Education Law Reporter, Education Law
and related textbooks were reviewed to supplement current literature. Furthermore,
“Blacks Law” was utilized to define the definitions of selected words, phrases, and legal
terms.
The following procedure was followed in order to identify appropriate cases for
analysis. First, the Goss case was “Shepardized.” “Shepardizing” a case is a process that
involves the manipulation of a computerized database o f United States case law in order
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to extract a listing o f all subsequent cases that have cited Goss v. Lopez. The process
revealed 2,492 federal and state cases which cited Goss v. Lopez since 1975.
Second, each o f the nearly 2,500 cases was reviewed individually in order to
determine applicability to the study. For example, cases decided outside the federal
courts and those taking place outside an educational setting were discarded. Specifically,
thousands o f cases merely cited Goss but had no relevance to the study. This sifting
process sorted each o f the cases into relevant and irrelevant groupings, thereby leaving
136 cases to be considered for study. Next, an additional forty-two cases that were
outside the K-12 spectrum or in the private sector were removed from consideration, with
the exception o f one higher education case that was particularly relevant to this study
(Board of Curators, Univ. of MO v. Horowitz. 1978).
O f the 94 remaining cases another eight were also removed from consideration,
since they were not directly related with procedural due process or did not provide
instructive analysis on the subject o f procedural due process as it relates to Goss v. Lopez
(e.g. Special Education due process). Finally, the 86 cases that remained were examined
for relevance.
Each o f the remaining eighty-six cases were briefed, with respect to the following
categories; citation, procedural setting, facts, holding, rationale o f holding, and if
applicable the concurring and / or dissenting opinions offered by the court. Specifically,
the name of the case and procedural setting, i.e. Goss v. Lopez 95 S. Ct. 729, were listed.
Next the facts as they related to Goss v. Lopez were explained in narrative form. The
holding, (who the court ruled for) and the rationale of the holding, (why the court ruled in
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favor of one party) were detailed. Finally, if applicable, the concurring and / or
dissenting opinions o f the court were reported.
“Briefing” the cases provided an analytical synopsis in standard form which,
allowed for the disclosure of emerging patterns and the various courts’ standard modus o f
operandi. Each o f the cases was documented in chapter four by chronological order and
by jurisdiction, (E.g. Supreme Court, E* Circuit,

Circuit, etc...). Goss v. Lopez was

applied to each case, thus revealing even more patterns as well as emerging / confusing
questions to be considered and analyzed.

Summary
Chapter three explained the means and methods utilized to explore the
jurisprudence o f Goss v. Lopez. Specifically, the process in which federal Case Law,
Nevada Revised Statutes, and Clark County School District Policies and Regulations
were obtained, disaggregated, and prepared for inclusion in the study were outlined.
Furthermore, it documented the various resources that were examined with regard to due
process in public schools and relevance to the Clark County School District and Nevada
Law as they pertain to the precedent set forth in Goss v. Lopez. Chapter Four will outline
the findings o f the study. More speeifically, it will present case law, Nevada Revised
Statutes, Clark County School District Policy, and Clark County School District
Regulations as they pertain to Goss v. Lopez.
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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Introduction
Eighty-six federal cases, Goss v. Lopez (Appendix A), CCSD Policy and
Regulations (Appendices B-F), and Nevada Revised Statutes (Appendix K) became the
focus of this study. Each o f the court cases examined fell into the parameters of K - 12
public education and each had an alleged complaint of procedural due process violation.
Furthermore, each o f the court cases was examined to determine the facts, procedural
setting, holding, rationale, and minority opinions. The cases were organized by
jurisdiction in chronological order and placed into sub-categorical order within each
federal circuit beginning with the Supreme Court then the First Circuit and ending with
the Eleventh Circuit. The Nevada Revised Statutes and Clark County School District
Regulations and Policies that pertained to due process were examined and summarized
and then categorized at the end of the Ninth Circuit, since Nevada is bound by Ninth
Circuit jurisprudence.

Case Law (Supreme Court)
Case
Wood

V.

Strickland. 95 S. Ct. 992 (1975)
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Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
Facts
Students enrolled at an Arkansas high school were expelled from school after they
violated a school regulation that prohibited them from using or possession intoxicating
beverages at school or school activities. Specifically, the students were charged with
“spiking” the punch that was served at a meeting. It seems that a girl drove across state
lines to procure the alcohol since the county in which she resided was “dry.” Although
there were no apparent effects of the “spiked punch,” ten days later a teacher heard and
then questioned the girls about the punch. At first they denied any involvement and then
later admitted to it. The three girls then admitted their participation to Principal Waller
who subsequently suspended them from school for ten school days. Shortly after. Waller
decided to expel the girls. The School Board upheld the recommendation and voted to
expel the girls for the remainder o f the semester.
The school regulation in which the girls were suspended for violating, prohibited
students from the use or possession o f intoxicating beverages, was linked to the definition
of “intoxicating liquor” under Arkansas statues. Those statutes, by weight, did not
include beer, which is the beverage the girls spiked the punch with. Furthermore, the
adoption of the regulation was to be applied to include beer. The District Court however,
indicated in its instructions that the question o f the proper construction of the regulation
would not be relevant if the jury found that the school officials in good faith considered
the malt liquor and punch to fall within the regulation. The Court o f Appeals ruled that
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the Defendants had the authority to prohibit the use and possession o f alcoholic
beverages or to continue its policy o f only prohibiting intoxicating beverages.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Goss by stating;
“Consider, for example, the recent five-to-four decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975), holding that a junior high school pupil routinely suspended for
as much as a single day is entitled to due process. I suggest that most lawyers and
judges would have thought, prior to that decision, that the law to the contrary was
settled, indisputable, and unquestioned.
The Court's rationale in Goss suggests, for example, that school officials may
infringe a student's right to education if they place him in a noncollegepreparatory track or deny him promotion with his class without affording a due
process hearing. See 419 U.S., at 597-599 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Does this
mean that school officials who fail to provide such hearings in the future will be
liable under § 1983 if a court subsequently determines that they were required?
(Wood v. Strickland. 1975 P. 1004)”
Holding
The judgment o f the Court o f Appeals was vacated and the case remanded for
further proceedings consistent with the opinion o f the Supreme Court.
Rationale o f Holding
The District Court ruled in favor o f the Defendants on the ground that, absent
proof o f malice, the defendants were immune from damage suits. The Court o f Appeals
for the Eighth Cireuit, finding that the facts showed a violation o f the students’ rights to
“substantive due process,” reversed and remanded for appropriate injunctive relief and a
new trial on the question o f damages. Soon after, this suit was heard on certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that in the specific context o f school discipline, school
officials are not immune from liability for damages if the school officials knew or should
have known that the actions would violate the constitutional rights o f the students.
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Certiorari was granted to consider whether the application o f due process governing
immunity for school board members from liability for compensatory damages was the
correct one. Therefore, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Goss by allowing the disciplinary
action, due to the fact that the girls had been informed o f the charges against them and
provided an opportunity to respond.
Dissent/Concurring Opinions
Judge Justice Powell, with Chief Justice Blackmun and Judge Rehnquist,
concurred in part and dissented in part with the ruling. They agreed that the judgment of
the court of Appeals should have been vacated and the case remanded. They also
dissented, with regard to the portion o f the case that appeared to impose a higher standard
o f care upon public school officials than that which is required o f any other official.
Case
Ingraham v. W right, 97 S. Ct. 1401, (1977)
Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
Facts
The complaint alleged that a violation o f both Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
Rights had been violated when the plaintiffs children were paddled. They contended
that the plaintiffs were paddled without prior notice and hearing and that the paddlings
were so severe as to keep one o f the plaintiffs out of school for eleven days and to
deprive the other plaintiff of the full use o f his arm for a week. Specifically, Ingram
presented testimony from sixteen students that suggested that because he was slow in
responding to his teacher’s instructions, was subjected to “more than 20 licks” with a
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paddle while being held over the Principal’s desk. The paddling was so severe that he
suffered a hematoma requiring medical attention, which kept him out o f school for
several days. Andrews claimed that he was paddled several times for minor infractions.
On two occasions he was struck on his arms, once depriving him o f the full use o f his
arm for a week.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, in the Supreme Court on appeal from the
Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals who initially was inclined to reverse the Fifth Circuit
District Court’s decision to dismiss the complaint, holding that there was no
constitutional basis for relief. Flowever, the Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals eventually
upheld the initial decision by ruling in favor o f the Defendants.
Holding
On Certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s
decision to dismiss the complaint. In an opinion by Powell, J., joined by Burger, Ch. J.,
and Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, JJ., it was held that the disciplinaiy paddling o f
public school students did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation o f the
Eighth Amendment, and that due process was not due, because “no state-created interest
in liberty going beyond the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection o f freedom from bodily
restraint and corporal punishment is involved with regard to corporal punishment of a
public school student” (US L Ed Digest, Constitutional Law 527, 803.5; Schools 1).
Rationale o f Holding
The United States Supreme Court affirmed that the disciplinary paddling o f public
school students did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation o f the Eighth
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Amendment since it did not violate the jurisprudence set forth in Goss v. Lopez. The
Supreme Court found;
“although corporal punishment in public schools implicated a constitutionally
protected liberty interest under the due process clause o f the Fourteenth
Amendment, nevertheless the due process clause did not require prior notice and a
hearing before the disciplinary paddling o f a student, since (a) the traditional
common law remedies preserved under state law were fully adequate to afford
due process, particularly when considered in light o f the openness o f the school
environment, and (b) even if the need for advance procedural safeguards were
clear, imposing a constitutional requirement of prior notice and a hearing would
significantly burden the use o f corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure and
would entail a significant intrusion into an area o f primary educational
responsibility, whereas the risk o f error that might result in violation o f a student's
substantive rights could only be regarded as minimal, in view of the low incidence
of abuse of corporal punishment by school authorities, the openness o f the public
schools, and the common law safeguards. (Ingraham v. W right. 1977 P. 1402)”
Therefore, the Court affirmed and re-defined Goss when it sided for the Defendants. The
Court affirmed the process that is due for disciplinary actions. However, by
acknowledging that the intent o f Goss was for disciplinary actions that deprive o f life,
liberty, or property interests it redefined the utilization o f the precedent by limiting Goss
to only such deprivations. It should also be noted that although procedural due process is
not guaranteed by law in corporal process cases, if corporal punishment is so harsh then
substantive due process may become necessary, per the Fourteenth Amendment.
Dissent/Concurring Opinions
White, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ, dissented. They
expressed the view that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment should not be restricted to those convicted o f crimes, but should also prohibit
all “barbaric punishments.” White further contended that disciplinary spanking o f school
children was in fact “punishment” which was covered by the Eighth Amendment
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notwithstanding that schools were open institutions subject to public scrutiny or that
adequate state remedies were available to school children.
White continued by stating that while not every instance o f spanking was
prohibited, it is necessary to provide minimal due process between the student and
disciplinarian since the student could not recover when the punishment resulted from a
reasonable, good faith mistake in the school disciplinary process. With regard to due
process claims, White stated in his dissenting opinion;
“the availability o f a tort action for "excessive" punishment did not afford due
process to the student, since the student could not recover when the punishment
resulted from a reasonable, good faith mistake in the school disciplinary process,
and particularly since even if the student could sue for good faith error in the
infliction o f punishment, the lawsuit would occur after the imposition of the
physical pain, which was final and irreparable and could not be undone in a
subsequent proceeding. (Ingraham v. W right, 1977 P. 1425)”
Case
Board of Curators. Univ. o f MO. v. Horowitz, 98 S. Ct. 948 (1978)
Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
Facts
Horowitz was a student in her final year o f study at the University of Missouri Kansas City Medical School in 1971. In the Spring of Horowitz’s first year of study,
several faculty members expressed dissatisfaction with her performance, hygiene, and
attendance. Upon recommendation by the Council o f Evaluation she was advanced to her
second and final year on a probationary basis. Dissatisfaction amongst the staff
continued during the second year, and they subsequently decided to deny her graduation
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for June of 1971. Additionally, the Council recommended that, absent “radical
improvement,” Horowitz be dropped from school.
Horowitz was permitted to appeal the decision by taking a set o f oral and practical
examinations. At the conclusion o f the examinations, two physicians recommended that
she be allowed to graduate, two recommended she be dropped from the school, and three
recommended that she should not be allowed to graduate and remain on probationary
status, pending further reports on her clinical progress. The Council on Evaluation met in
May, 1971 to consider whether Horowitz be allowed to remain in school beyond June of
that year. The Council unanimously reaffirmed its recommendation and dropped
Horowitz from the school. Suit was filed in the Eighth Circuit District Court, which
subsequently sided in favor o f the School, however, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the decision and found in favor o f Horowitz. The school then brought a third
and final court action to the United States Supreme Court.
Holding
The United States Supreme Court held that Horowitz was afforded full procedural
due process and thereby sided with the school o f medicine.
Rationale o f Holding
The Supreme Court ruled in agreement with the District Court that Horowitz;
“was afforded full procedural due process by the [School]. In fact, the Court is of
the opinion, and so finds, that the school went beyond [constitutionally required]
procedural due process by affording [respondent] the opportunity to be examined
by seven independent physicians in order to be absolutely certain that their
grading of the [respondent] in her medical skills was correct. (Board o f Curators.
Univ. of MO. V. Horowitz. 1978 P. 952)”
Furthermore, the Court held in accordance with Goss that due process requires, in
connection with the suspension o f a student for disciplinary reasons; notice, opportunity
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to respond, and an appeal process. Additionally, the Court found that the decision to
dismiss, Horowitz, was careful and deliberate.
According to the Court, disciplinary cases have;
“no application...M isconduct is a very different matter from failure to attain a
standard o f excellence in studies. A determination as to the fact involves
investigation o f a quite different kind. A public hearing may be regarded as
helpful to the ascertainment of misconduct and useless or harmful in finding out
the truth as to scholarship. (Board o f Curators. Univ. o f MO. v. Horowitz, 1978
P. 953)"
Furthermore, the Court, with respect to procedural due process, warned against any such
judicial intrusion into academic decision making, by declaring the following;
“Academic evaluations o f a student, in contrast to disciplinary determinations,
bear little resemblance to the judicial and administrative fact finding proceedings
to which we have traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement. In Goss, the
school's decision to suspend the students rested on factual conclusions that the
individual students had participated in demonstrations that had disrupted classes,
attacked a police officer, or caused physical damage to school property. The
requirement o f a hearing, where the student could present his side o f the factual
issue, could under such circumstances "provide a meaningful hedge against
erroneous action." Ibid. The decision to dismiss respondent, by comparison,
rested on the academic judgment o f school officials that she did not have the
necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was
making insufficient progress toward that goal. Such a judgment is by its nature
more subjective and evaluative than the typical factual questions presented in the
average disciplinary decision. Like the decision o f an individual professor as to
the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination whether to dismiss
a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation o f cumulative
information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools o f judicial or
administrative decision making.
Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic judgm ent of
educators and thereby formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring a
hearing. The educational process is not by nature adversary; instead it centers on a
continuing relationship between faculty and students, "one in which the teacher
must occupy many roles - educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parentsubstitute (Goss v. Lopez. 1975).” This is especially true as one advances through
the varying regimes o f the educational system, and the instruction becomes both
more individualized and more specialized. In Goss, this Court concluded that the
value o f some form o f hearing in a disciplinary context outweighs any resulting
harm to the academic environment. Influencing this conclusion was clearly the
belief that disciplinary proceedings, in which the teacher must decide whether to
punish a student for disruptive or insubordinate behavior, may automatically bring
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an adversary flavor to the normal student-teacher relationship. The same
conclusion does not follow in the academic context. We decline to further enlarge
the judicial presence in the academic community and thereby risk deterioration o f
many beneficial aspects o f the faculty-student relationship. (Board of Curators.
Univ. of MO. V. Horowitz. 1978 Pp. 953 - 954)”
Dissent/Concurring Opinions
Judge Justice Marshall concurred and dissented in the judgment and expressed the
following view;
“I agree with the Court that, "assuming the existence o f a liberty or property
interest, respondent has been awarded at least as much due process as the
Fourteenth Amendment requires." Ante, at 84-85.1 cannot join the Court's
opinion, however, because it contains dictum suggesting that respondent was
entitled to even less procedural protection than she received. I also differ from the
Court in its assumption that characterization o f the reasons for a dismissal as
"academic" or "disciplinary" is relevant to resolution o f the question o f what
procedures are required by the Due Process Clause. Finally, I disagree with the
Court's decision not to remand to the Court o f Appeals for consideration of
respondent's substantive due process claim. (Board o f Curators. Univ. of MO. v.
Horowitz, 1978, P. 958)”
Case
Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986)
Procedural Setting
U.S. Supreme Court
Facts
A high school student delivered a speech, nominating one o f his friends for a
student council office, at an assembly. The speech included numerous references to the
candidate in terms of sexual metaphors. After Fraser made statements like, “he’s firm in
his pants... his character is firm,” “a man who takes his point and pounds it in,” and “a
man who will go to the very end -even the climax, for each and every one o f you,” the
students at the assembly began to make sexually suggestive gestures while others
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appeared to be bewildered and embarrassed. Furthermore, some o f the students
continued to be disruptive many days after the incident. Additionally, before Fraser
made the speech, he discussed it with at least two o f his teachers, who informed him that
the speech was “inappropriate” and that if given he might have to endure “severe
consequences.” The day after the speech, Fraser was placed on a three-day suspension.
He served two o f the three-days and was readmitted on the morning o f the third day.
Bethel brought an action suit in the District Court for the Western district o f Washington.
Holding
The United States Supreme Court held that Fraser’s free speech and due process
rights had not been violated when Bethel School District suspended him for two days
after he made sexually suggestive comments during a speech at a school assembly.
Rationale o f Holding
The District Court awarded Fraser damages and allowed him to speak at
graduation. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed the order claiming
that there was no merit to the claim that the suspension violated due process on the
ground that Fraser had no way o f knowing that the delivery o f the speech would subject
him to disciplinary sanctions. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a two-day suspension
does not call for full panoply o f procedural due process protections applicable to a
criminal prosecution. The Court also recognized that because the school had a prior
disciplinary rule in effect and that because o f the prior admonitions o f at least two
teachers, Fraser was given adequate warning that his speech could subject him to
sanctions when at least two of his teachers warned of the consequences if he chose to
give his speech as written. Additionally, the Court found no merit to the claim that the
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suspension violated due process due to the fact that Fraser had adequate notice and
opportunity to tell his side of the story and still chose to give a speech that contained
graphic and explicit sexual metaphors. The Court cited Goss v. Lopez by stating;
“Two days' suspension from school does not rise to the level o f a penal sanction
calling for the full panoply of procedural due process protections applicable to a
criminal prosecution. The school disciplinary rule proscribing "obscene"
language and the pre-speech admonitions of teachers gave adequate warning to
Fraser that his lewd speech could subject him to sanctions. (Bethel School Dist. v.
Fraser. 1986 P. 3163)”
Finally, it has been noted that the ruling in Bethel further affirmed the ruling o f Goss.
Specifically, the Bethel decision was based on the facts that all due process protections
outlined in Goss were adhered to.
Dissent/Concurring Opinions
Judge J. Brennan concurred in the judgment and expressed the following view:
“(1) It was not unconstitutional for school officials to conclude under the
circumstances that the student’s remarks exceeded permissible limits, and (2) the
officials did not exceed the bounds of their disciplinary authority, but (3) the
language o f speech was not obscene, and (4) school officials thus could not
punish the speech out of a need to protect younger students.” (Bethel School Dist.
V. Fraser, 1986, P. 3165)
Judge J. Marshall dissented by expressing the view that;
“The Court o f Appeals’ judgment should not have been disturbed, because the
school district had failed to bring in evidence sufficient to convince either the
District Court or the Court of Appeals that education was disrupted at the school
by the student’s speech.” (Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 1986, P. 3166)
Finally, Judge J. Stevens dissented by stating,
“(1) Neither the school’s disciplinary rule nor the teachers’ warnings gave the
student fair notice that he would be punished for delivering his speech, and (2) the
speech’s impropriety was not so obvious that no specific notice was required.”
(Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 1986, P. 3168)
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Summary
Wood, Horowitz, Ingraham, and Bethel comprised the only four federal cases
heard by the Supreme Court dealing with procedural and substantive due process, within
the parameters o f this study, since Goss. All four cases reaffirmed the prior ruling, set
forth in Goss v. Lopez. However, in the case o f Ingraham, which the disciplinary action
taken by the school was in the form o f corporal punishment, the Court held that Goss was
intended to be utilized as a guideline for loss o f life, liberty, and property violations, of
which corporal punishment did not apply. More specifically, Ingraham did not find
infringement o f a property interest in administration of corporal punishment. Therefore,
while Ingraham affirmed Goss, it also redefined the landmark case by limiting if s
applicability to only short-term suspensions as a loss o f constitutionally protected
property interest in the form o f removal from school or termination o f educational
services.
Furthermore, in the case o f Horowitz, it should be noted that although this case
deals with higher education, it was evident to this author that it’s relevancy to this work
outweighed the sifting process noted in Chapter Three. The Horowitz Court ruled that
academic discipline does not fall under the protection o f Goss, because administrative
decisions based on incompetence do not constitute disciplinary action or loss of property
interest based on disciplinary action.
Case Law (E ‘ Circuit)
Case
Bauza v. Morales Carrion, 578 F.2d 447, (1st Cir., 1978)
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Procedural Setting
E* Circuit - Court o f Appeals
Facts
Claudio Bauza was one o f 102 applicants in March o f 1976 trying to vie for 25
positions in the upcoming kindergarten class o f the Elementary School o f the University
o f Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras Campus. Admission to kindergarten o f the elementary
school opens up an opportunity to stay at the school through its various levels that
ultimately includes high school. The parents o f Bauza alleged that the school had
preferred some children rather than selecting by lot from among all qualified applicants.
Bauza’s family indicated that five o f the vacancies were filled with students who had not
achieved progress the previous year and were retained, thereby only creating twenty
vacancies for the 1976 - 1977 school year. Bauza and 76 other students survived the
initial testing and interview procedure. Twenty o f those students were subsequently
selected of which Bauza was not one of them.
In May o f 1976, a waiting list was derived and each o f the students on the list was
separated into three categories by I.Q. The categories were labeled excellent, good and
average, o f which Bauza was not placed on the “excellent” list. By mid August, eight
spaces had opened and seven students were selected. The director testified that she chose
those students whose parents had re-expressed interest after their initial rejeetion. An
eighth student was seleeted from the “good” list solely on the basis o f being the child of a
new teacher at the sehool, whieh is a preference specified in the school regulation and
approved by the District Court. It was also revealed that the initial seven students were
children of professors at the University o f Puerto Rico. The regulation read, “There will
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be no waiting list neither o f Level 1 nor for any other level while the registration per
group is not reduced to the agreed norm.” Bauza failed to be admitted to the school and
her parents brought suit against the school.
Holding
The Court granted judgment as a matter o f law for the school, since there was no
violation of procedural due process.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court found that the practice o f waiting list selection, although carried on in
the past, had been abolished since 1973. The Court ruled that the defendants had adopted
and implemented a discriminatory system o f admission to the school and therefore
violated rights to the equal protection laws, in which Brown v. Board o f Education and
Goss

V.

Lopez were cited. The court also found that Bauza had met all eligibility

requirements, and was, “Entitled to be considered in the lottery for entrance along with
many other qualified applicants.” Furthermore, the Court stated;
“Plaintiffs' claim does not rest on any contention that their child was being denied
a free public education generally. Other schools are available. Indeed, plaintiffs
claim no absolute right for their child to attend the University School —their
claim boils down to a claim o f right to participate in a lottery for the limited
number of available places. Nor is this a case where having been admitted to a
particular school, plaintiffs' child was suspended or dismissed without being
afforded adequate process. (Bauza v. Morales Carrion. 1978 P. 452)”
The Court held that because the Plaintiff was not denied a liberty or property
interest without adequate process, and the fact that other schools were available to the
plaintiff, Bauza had no absolute right to attend the University School. Therefore, the
Court found that any claims o f due process violations were moot. Therefore, although
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Goss was cited, Bauza just as Ingraham found that in order for Goss to be applicable a
denial of school attendance must have oceurred.
Case
Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995, (1®‘ Cir., 1982)
Procedural Setting
Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On December 11, 1979, while attending public school at Mattanawcook
Academy, Daniel Boynton was questioned by the school principal and vice-principal
concerning his use o f marijuana on school premises. During the questioning, Boynton
admitted using marijuana on school property and was immediately suspended from
school.
The disputes stemmed from four alleged violations. The first count was due to
Boynton being questioned without his parents being present and subsequently admitting
to possessing and using marijuana on school property. Boynton’s second count claimed
that although he attended various “substance abuse” programs the school board expelled
him from school without identifying the reason. The third count in question was because,
Boynton alleged that the disciplinary committee’s actions were “arbitrary, improper and
an abuse o f the discretion given to the school officials.” Boynton argued, (count three)
that he was not given notice or opportunity to be heard and, (count four), that he was
placed on school probation, were in violation o f his due process rights. Finally, Daniel
Boynton brought suit, alleging that the principal and vice-principal denied him due
process of the law.
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Holding
The complaints were dismissed for failure to state a federal eonstitutional claim
upon which relief could be granted.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court found that with regard to the first count, Boynton was granted due
process rights through the questioning that took place at the school. Furthermore, the
Court found no authority sustaining any constitutional right to have Boynton’s parents
present during questioning. Boynton’s allegation that he was not read his rights was not
applicable in the school setting. The second count of the complaint, failure to assign
reasons for the expulsion, cited Wood v. Strickland, where the Eighth Circuit held that
the evidence produced at the school board disciplinary hearing was insufficient.
However, the Court found that the necessary evidence was produced and thereby sided
with the school. With regard to the third count, the Court ruled that Boynton was given
ample opportunity to be heard during the initial questioning that took place at the school.
The Court went on to hold that the expulsion o f a student for the remainder o f the school
year for smoking marijuana in school was not unconstitutional. Although the plaintiff
seemed to suggest that his participation in substance-abuse programs satisfactorily
evidenced his repentance that entitled him to immediate reinstatement into school.
The Court held that participation in the courses did not render the boards action as
arbitrary. Finally, with regard to count four, placing Boynton on “school probation,” the
court ruled that the action taken did not amount to deprivation o f any constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest, thereby adhering to Goss. Therefore, because the
case at hand did not constitute violation o f due process law because there was no loss of
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protected interests, the Court found that the fundamental jurisprudence of Goss was
followed.
Case
Donovan v. Ritchie. 68 F.3d 14, (Mass. 1995)
Procedural Setting
D* Circuit - Court o f Appeals
Facts
On September 18, 1994, approximately fifteen students gathered in a student’s
home and created “The Shit List.” “The Shit List” contained general remarks of
“boorish” nature and also zeroed in on 140 named students. One or more lines o f crude
descriptions o f character and/or behavior followed each name. The descriptions included
insulting comments about appearance or social conduct, epithets that were suggestive of
sexual capacity, proclivity, and promiscuity. Donovan and two other boys made copies
o f the list, put them in a trash barrel, and then delivered it to the school shortly after. Mr.
Ritchie, prineipal, began an investigation soon after a faculty member discovered the
documents. On Monday, September 26, 1994, two days later, Donovan and two others
were summoned to Mr. Ritchie’s office and subsequently denied any involvement. The
next day the students returned and confessed that they had photocopied the material.
Furthermore, the students stated that because the copying had been done off school
property they were not subject to school discipline. On Thursday, September 29, 1994, a
letter was sent to the fifteen students requesting a meeting with them and their parents.
During that meeting, Mr. Ritchie informed the students that they were in violation
o f the school’s rules, regarding school disruption, and suspended the students
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indefinitely. He also informed the students that information would be forthcoming and
that each student was to write an apology letter. On September 30, 1994, Donovan issued
his letter, which apologized for his “bad mistake.” Two days later, Mr. Ritchie wrote
Donovan’s mother and issued a ten-day suspension as well as exclusion from any school
social events and interscholastic athletics. Appeals to the superintendent and later to the
school committee were unsuecessful. Donovan brought suit under both state and federal
statutes and constitutional provisions after he was suspended for ten days from school
and excluded from various extracurricular activities. During a five-day bench trial the
argument focused on whether Donovan had been afforded procedural due process. The
District Court applied the jurisprudence in Goss v. Lopez by stating;
“We are, therefore, dealing with the kind o f temporary suspension at issue in Goss
Lopez. In that ease the Court succinetly summarized the three procedural
prerequisites: "that the student be given oral or written notice o f the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation o f the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." The Court added, "In
the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged
misconduct with the student minutes after it has oceurred." In order for the
student "to explain his version o f the facts at this discussion, [he should] first be
told what he is accused o f doing and what the basis o f the accusation is."
"Requiring that there be at least an informal give-and-take between student and
disciplinarian," the Court concluded, would at least give the student "the
opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper
context. (Donovan v. Ritchie. 1995 P. 17)”
V.

Holding
The Court granted judgment as a matter o f law for the school since notice and
opportunity to be heard was granted.
Rationale o f Holding
The Appeals Court declared that Donovan had clearly been given adequate notice
and he had ample opportunity to present his version o f the facts. Finally, the District
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Court granted judgment as a matter o f law for the school and found the process given
Donovan was adequate. Specifically, Donovan was allowed to give his side of the story
on September 26, 27, and 30, 1994. Furthermore, he was issued notice o f his suspension
and the facts surrounding the decision in written and oral form on September 29, 1994.
Donovan filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The
Court o f Appeals reaffirmed Goss by stating;
”We conclude from the record that appellant had, and took advantage of, multiple
opportunities to present his view o f what occurred. On September 26, he and two
others met with Principal Ritchie and denied any involvement. On September 27,
they had another meeting and admitted photocopying, but no knowledge of
contents. They also advanced their defense that their act did not take place on
school property. On September 30, appellant and his mother met separately with
Principal Ritchie, after a larger meeting, and had the opportunity to add to what
had been said. (Donovan v. Ritchie, 1995 P. 18)”
Case
Zehner v. Central Berkshire Regional Sch. Dist.. 921 F. Supp. 850, (D. Mass. 1996)
Procedural Setting
U‘ Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On October 15, 1993, Zehner, a senior at Wahconah Regional High School in
Dalton, Massachusetts, was leaving the school parking lot at the conclusion o f the school
day. Zehner drove his truck at a very slow rate, thus hampering the flow of traffic. The
defendants provided the school handbook that stated that student driven cars must not
interfere with the school buses and infractions o f motor vehicle rules would result in the
loss o f the privilege of bringing a car to school.

Zehner informed Mr. Farley, Assistant

Principal, that his parents were out o f town and parental contact advising of the loss of
privileges was not conveyed to Zehner’s parents until later in the week.
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Zehner attended a school dance with his girlfriend on October 29, 1993.
According to school officials, Zehner attended the dance, “exhibiting impaired speech, a
strong odor o f alcohol and an unsteady gait.” Farley and Mr. Potter, Principal,
questioned Zehner about his condition and Zehner denied using alcohol prior to attending
the dance. Potter charged Zehner with the use of alcohol and gave him the opportunity to
respond. Officer McGinnis then took Zehner's car keys away from him. Zehner was
directed to report to the principal’s office the following Monday, and no attempt was
made to contact his parents.
On November 1, 1993, Zehner was met by his soccer coach and informed that he
was off the team for the rest o f the season. Zehner then called his mother asking her to
come to his school. At approximately 8:00 a.m. Mrs. Zehner met with Farley and Potter
concerning the incident at the dance. During that conference, Zehner and his mother
were informed o f the charges and told that Zehner would not only be excluded from the
soccer team but would also have to serve a three-day suspension from school. Zehner in
the presence o f his mother called Potter a “fucking prick” and then left the office. Mrs.
Zehner was advised o f her right to appeal to the superintendent. Documentation of the
suspension was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Zehner.
The third and final disciplinary action, a three day suspension, occurred on
November 10, 1993, when Zehner was questioned by a teacher as to why he skipped his
study hall class. Zehner immediately became hostile and threatened the teacher by
saying, “That’s it buddy, I am going to get you! I am going to sue you!” Farley
ultimately called the police at which point Zehner turned his anger towards him by
saying, “You think you are so tough, why don’t you take off your badge.”
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Subsequently, William Zehner Jr. alleged that he wrongfully received two threeday suspensions from school, was excluded from the soccer team for the remainder of the
season, and not allowed to park his truck in the school lot.
Holding
Zehner’s motion for summary judgment was denied and the cross motion for summary
judgment by the school was allowed since Zehner was granted full procedural due
process.
Rationale o f Holding
The District Court found that Zehner was given both oral and written notice and
an opportunity to present his side o f the story consistent with Goss. Furthermore the
Court ruled that while the suspensions clearly fell under due process safeguard due to
property/liberty interests, it found that loss o f parking privileges and removal from the
soccer team did not. Therefore, removal from extracurricular activities and loss of
privileges are not protected under constitutional law. Finally, the District Courts and
Courts of Appeals have consistently found that if no determination o f loss o f life,
property, or liberty is made, due process claims are outside the protection o f Goss.

Case
Demers v. Leominster Sch. Dep't. 263 F. Supp. 2d 195, (D. Mass. 2003)
Procedural Setting
C Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On April 5, 2000, Michael Demers was a fifteen year-old eighth grade special
education student at Northwest School in Leominster, Massachusetts. On that day he was
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dismpting his English class through excessive talking and was reprimanded by his
teacher. When he continued to be disruptive, Demers was asked to go next door to his
math teacher’s classroom. The math teacher instructed him to draw a picture showing
how he felt about being removed from his English class. Michael made a drawing o f his
school surrounded by explosives and students hanging out o f the windows. On the other
side o f the paper Demers drew the Superintendent o f the school with a gun at his head.
Later that same day, the drawing was delivered to the principal’s office. Two days later,
Michael was called to the principal’s office and confronted with the drawing. Michael
stated that it was only an assignment and he was expressing his feelings. Michael was
suspended until a meeting could be held on April 11, 2000.
Michael was required to meet with the personnel director, who told him that if he
was “cleared” by a psychiatrist and got “medication,” he could remain in school. A
“team” meeting took place on April 11, 2000, which included Michael, his father, the
principal, the personnel director and members o f his special education team. Michael
was allowed to remain in school on the condition that he received a psychiatric
evaluation. The record was unclear as to whether Michael ever intended to see a
psychiatrist after M ichael’s dad informed the principal that he was unable to get Michael
to the psychiatric evaluation. The principal did not allow Michael to return to school due
to the fact that the stipulated condition had not been met.
On May 1, 2000, a team meeting was held which resulted in the decision that
Michael should be excluded from school for the remainder o f the school year and that
alternative special services would be provided. The personnel director received a letter
via the superintendent that requested an immediate appeal o f the exclusion. The
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personnel director then informed M ichael’s father that there would be no hearing and that
the school department was required only to provide Michael with an alternative education
plan. On May 16, 2000, an action was filed in the Court alleging violations o f M ichael’s
state and federal constitutional rights and state law.
Holding
The court held that the school officials did not violate Demers due process rights
since there was no loss o f property interest.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court ruled that due process requirements o f Goss were met with regard to
M ichael’s initial suspension. Specifically, Demers was presented with the charges
against him, provided the opportunity to respond, and given various avenues in which to
appeal. Furthermore the Court cited IDEA, which requires that parents be provided the
“opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the
identification, evaluation, or educational placement o f the [disabled] child. Further,
parents with a complaint are entitled to an impartial due process hearing.” Therefore, the
Court held that Michael had other avenues that had not been exhausted in which to be
heard. With regard to Goss, Demers was given the opportunity to attend an alternative
setting and therefore was not removed from school. Thus from a procedural due process
perspective, Goss did not apply since there was no loss o f property interest.
Summary
Five eases relevant to this study from the E' Circuit were briefed. Specifically,
three from the U.S. District Court and two from the U.S. E ‘ Circuit Court of Appeals
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were examined for relevance. Furthermore, o f the five cases all were sided in favor o f
the Defendants.

Case Law (2"^ Circuit)
Case
Ouimette v. Babbie, 405 F. Supp. 525 (D. Vt. 1975)
Procedural Setting
2"'^ Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
Missisquoi Valley Union High School (MVUHS) established physical education
as a required course o f study in which Ouimette refused to attend and participate.
Subsequently, she was suspended from school. A hearing on November 14, 1975,
permitted Yvonne to return to classes pending further hearing on the merits that was held
on November 28, 1975. In the interim, a board hearing was held (which also allowed the
plaintiffs the opportunity to present reasons for Ouimette’s refusal to attend and
participate in class) and the board members to continue its policy o f requiring all seventh
grade students to attend classes in physical education and to continue the suspension from
the school until she attended and participated in physical education class.
At the beginning of the school year, the Ouimette’s were informed that Yvonne
would have to participate in physical education class and that classes would be conducted
two hours each week during the school year. It was also stated that the remaining three
hours a week would be devoted to Language Arts class. However, due to a curtailment in
funds, the Language Arts class was eliminated and Babbie supplemented the schedule
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with an additional three hours o f physical education class.

Yvonne attended all o f her

classes with the exception o f physical education. The school entertained numerous
conferences with Yvonne and her parents. Yvonne and her father were adamant that she
would not attend the elass. Supervised study periods were substituted until the next
board meeting.
On September 18, 1975, the board o f directors o f MVUHS gave Yvonne and her
parents the opportunity to present their objections. The only argument presented was that
Yvonne “should have every right to do only what she wanted to.” Subsequently, the
board denied the request and continued to direct Ouimette to attend all o f her classes or
be excluded from school altogether. Plaintiff Kent Ouimette brought suit, on hehalf of
his daughter Yvonne, against the principal. Babbie, and school directors of the
Missisquoi Valley Union High School (MVUHS) for excluding her from attending
school.
Holding
The District Court held that the requirements o f Goss had been satisfied and
subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief by dismissing the case.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court found that when the Ouimette’s testified in court the reasons for
Yvonne not attending class were expanded to not having enough time to get to class
without being tardy, lack o f individual shower rooms, and disinterest in competitive
athletics. The defendants offered to accommodate Yvonne by scheduling the physical
education elass for the last period o f the day. Furthermore, since Yvonne was given
adequate opportunity to present her side o f the story and because the Ouimettes were
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notified of the charges against Yvonne, the Court held that Yvonne had been deprived of
the opportunity to attend school. However, they also found that in this particular instance
the deprivation was the product o f the plaintiffs’ choice.
According to Goss, the District Court held that since it was the Ouimette’s choice
to not attend school, there were no substantial grounds that property interest had been
denied. Moreover, the District Court cited Goss by citing the following;
“The essentials o f due process are notice that disciplinary action is under
consideration and an adequate opportunity for the student and her parents to
present their side of the story. This includes the opportunity to listen to the
explanation o f the school authorities concerning the reasons for any disciplinary
action that may be contemplated in the situation that confronts them. These
precautionary measures, absent an emergency situation, should precede removal.
(Ouimette v. Babbie. 1975 P. 525)”
’’Each o f these requirements was fulfilled in Yvonne's temporary suspension, both
at the initial hearing in September and at the second hearing on November 20,
when the plaintiffs had the assistance o f counsel. From the record it appears that
both hearings were essentially fair. The process due the plaintiffs has been
accorded them within the precepts o f Goss. The court recognizes that the school
board and the administration, in the action taken, were deciding on the validity of
policy requirements which were imposed by the defendants. In this civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only the constitutional right to Due Process has
been asserted. Once these requirements have been met, there is no remaining issue
for decision. (Ouimette v. Babbie. 1975 P. 529)”
Additionally, although minimal due process had been given to the Ouimette’s, in the
case at hand Goss does not apply when deprivation o f life, liberty, or property is absent.
Case
Johnpoll

V.

Elias. 513 F. Supp. 430, (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
Procedural Setting

2"^ Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.Y.
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Facts
Joseph Johnpoll was a tenth grade special education student in September of
1980. Johnpoll, while in junior high school, was asked to choose the school he would
like to attend the following year. Johnpoll subsequently choose John Jay High School
because the two schools he desired to attend were not on the issued list. It also seems
that Johnpoll was informed that he would likely be assigned to either Murrow or
Midwood, which were his schools o f choice. Johnpoll brought suit when he learned that
he was assigned to John Jay.
Johnpoll contended that the district failed to consider his emotional and physical
handicap and was denied due process. The plaintiffs alleged that compelling Johnpoll to
attend John Jay High School would make it impossible for him to gain an education by
stating, “With its rampant crime, violence, drugs and social behavior that is sexually and
emotionally far more open than Joseph has experienced.”
Holding
The motion for a preliminary injunction was denied since Johnpoll was not denied
property interests.
Rationale o f Holding
The District Court found that this particular case did not present a situation, which
the Goss Court sought to protect, due to the fact that Johnpoll had not been denied his
right to education. Therefore, because Johnpoll was offered an education but refused to
attend the protections guaranteed by Goss did not apply. Specifically, the District Court
stated;
“This case does not present a situation which the Goss court sought to protect
since Joseph has not been denied his right to education. He can receive an
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education at John Jay. Merely because Joseph is not being permitted to attend the
school o f his choice is not tantamount to a denial o f a right to an education.
(Johnpoll V. Elias. 1980 P. 431)”

Case
Orozco

V.

Sobol. 703 F. Supp. 1113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
Procedural Setting

2™" Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.Y
Facts
On September 9, 1987, Sixta L. Orozco tried to enroll in the Mount Vernon public
schools after professing her desire to find permanent housing in that city. School
officials informed her and her mother that she could not be enrolled in that school system
since she did not reside in Mount Vernon. On September 10, 1987, Ms. Arroyo, Orozco’s
mother attempted to enroll Orozco into the Yonkers school system and was again refused
enrollment for the same reason.
School opened on September 10, and Ms. Arroyo instituted action contending that
Orozco was denied her right to a public education in New Y ork without being afforded
the protections accorded by due process. Furthermore, the State Commissioner of
Education, who has general supervisory authority over New Y ork’s public school system
under N.Y. Educ. Law, knew that local school districts had a pattern and practice of
denying homeless children admission into their schools without any modicum of
procedural protections.
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Holding
The Court ruled that certain levels o f appeal did exist; therefore a minimal amount
of due process also existed. Consequently the defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted
in part.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction requiring that Orozco be
admitted to the Yonkers school district so long as her then-existing living conditions
continued to occur (living in a shelter in Yonkers). After the ruling two important events
occurred, first Orozco and her mother moved to Puerto Rico, thus voluntarily
withdrawing from the Yonkers school system, and secondly the New York Board of
Regents approved new regulations governing the placement of homeless children in New
Y ork’s educational system. The second change mandated that any decision denying a
child from attending school must be preceded by a hearing and accompanied by notice
outlining the bases of the decision and avenues of appeal.
The court quoted Honig v. Doe by citing the mootness doctrine. The fact that the
plaintiff had returned to Puerto Rico suggested that she no longer retained a “personal
stake” in the outcome of the litigation, and thereby rendered her claims moot. The Court
ruled that if local school districts had a practice of summarily denying education to
students already enrolled in their school would certainly violate due process rights.
However, a student who has not enrolled does not necessarily have a cognizable property
interest in public education. In this particular case Orozco was sheltered at the time in
question in Yonkers, and her mother desired to live in Mount Vernon. However, given
her economic situation, she had little control o f where she could afford to live and there
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was no need for a hearing to resolve factual disputes since all pertinent information was
fairly known. Therefore, although Goss would have applied because Orozco was
previously enrolled in Yonkers and because Orozco was living in a shelter located in the
attendance zone o f Yonkers, since Orozco and her family moved to Puerto Rico, her due
process rights were no longer applicable.
“If local school districts had a practice of summarily denying continued education
to students already enrolled in their schools, then we have little doubt that this
would constitute a violation o f due process and noting that when a child is already
within a school district's control and is subsequently denied continued admission
without notice and hearing, such conduct violates due process. That is not the
situation before us, however. We are presented with a homeless child —who was
not then enrolled in a New York school and whose residency for school purposes
is a matter o f great dispute —who was seeking and was summarily denied
admission. (Orozco v. Sobok 1989 P. 1118- 1119)”
’’Indeed, although this case is framed within the context of procedural due
process, the issue is more one o f placement than it is of process —i.e., defining
how a timely and fair determination o f plaintiffs residence can be made so as to
allow her placement in the proper public school. To be sure, this question
embraces certain Fourteenth Amendment concerns. Whatever means are chosen,
they must comport with the root requirements o f due process (notice and hearing)
since plaintiff has a constitutionally cognizable property interest in a New York
public education. It does not necessarily follow, however, as plaintiff contends,
that due process requires the local school districts to provide the hearing on
residency matters. (Orozco v. Sobok 1989 P. 1118- 1119)”
Case
F.N. bv & Through D.N. v. Board o f Education o f Sachem Central School District. 894
F. Supp. 605, (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
Procedural Setting
2"" Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.Y.
Facts
F.N., a tenth grade student at Sachem High School South, was a special education
student whose history o f academic, social, and emotional difficulties dated back to his
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kindergarten year. Although there had never been any documented misconduct at school
prior to January 5, 1995, F.N. was suspended for five-days for inappropriate sexual
behavior directed at his Spanish teacher.
On January 5, 1995, F.N .’s Spanish teacher reported that while she was alone in
the classroom with F.N., he began to masturbate, followed her around the room, and
refused to either stop or leave the room as directed. F.N .’s parents alleged that they were
not advised by the school district at the January 10, 1995, meeting o f their son’s rights
under IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, or N.Y. Educ Law Article 89, which identifies rights
of children with handicaps. The school alleged that they had informed the parents and
gave them a packet entitled “Parental Due Process Rights.” The plaintiffs deny that they
received any information.
During the hearing conducted by the superintendent on January 10, 1995, it
appeared that the defendants agreed that F.N. would be referred for evaluations and
receive home instruction pending completion o f the evaluations. F.N .’s parents requested
an impartial hearing to review the determination o f the suspension. The plaintiffs refused
to attend the hearing and instead threatened to bring suit if their son was not allowed to
return to school. On April 25, 1995, one of the initial psychologists reevaluated his
earlier findings, which recommended that F.N. be returned to the regular classroom and
that he was suffering an adverse impact from his continued exclusion from school.
Subsequently, F.N. was denied his motion for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction after he brought suit against the Board o f Education o f Sachem
Central School District at Holbrook.
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Holding
The p laintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction with regard to the claim that the defendants have deprived F.N. o f a publie
education, to which he is entitled by N.Y Edue. La in violation o f the Fourteenth
Amendment, was denied.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court found that the sehool-direeted evaluations took place and resulted in a
determination that F.N. was not handicapped. Furthermore, the Court found that it was
evident that the home instruction was not conducted in a regular or reliable manner. With
this in mind the Court held that the school had satisfied due process procedures set forth
by both state and federal law. Additionally, while the Court was concerned with the
lengthy period in which F.N.’s education was interrupted, it also found that the plaintiffs
failed to show that the school district had violated any prescribed procedure with regard
to notice and hearing. Finally, the Court ruled that since F.N. was not only allowed but
also directed to attend school F.N. was not denied an education according to Goss.
Case
Mazevski v. Horseheads Cent. Sch. Dist., 950 F. Supp. 69, (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
Procedural Setting
Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.Y.
Facts
During the 1994 - 95 School year George Mazevski was a junior at Horseheads
High School and a member o f the marching band. Mazevski alleged that he had three
musical performances scheduled o f which two were associated with the school.
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Mazevski stated that Carichner had informed him that he could miss one of two events
but not both. Cariehner contended that he gave Mazevski permission to miss the first
event scheduled on October 15, but not the one set for October 22, 1994.
Mazevski attended the performance on the 15* and subsequently missed the 22"‘*
performance. The next Monday when Mazevski attended school, his counselor informed
him that he was no longer part o f the marching band because he missed the performance
on October 22. Furthermore, due to his dismissal from the band he was no longer eligible
to participate in the All State Band.
M azevski’s parents met with Principal Kent and were informed that the
circumstances would be reviewed. Kent talked to all of the school’s music teachers and it
was decided that the dismissal would stand. The court ruled in favor o f the defendants by
granting summary judgment, arguing that participation in a high school marching band
does not constitute a constitutionally protected property interest, entitling Mazevski to
procedural due process.
M azevski’s parents opposed the motion for summary judgment by claiming that
their son’s participation in the band was constitutionally protected because it was a
curricular activity that Mazevski received academic credit and because he had to pay $75
to participate. Therefore, the issue in this case is whether Mazevski was denied a specific
constitutional guarantee.
Holding
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and the plaintiffs’
complaint was dismissed for lack of property interest.
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Rationale of Holding
The Court found that before one is entitled to due process, a property interest
must be established. Dangler v. Yorktown Cent. Seh. Therefore, the issue was whether
Mazevski’s participation in the marching band rises to the level o f a property interest.
Goss

V.

Lopez spoke in terms o f the total “educational process,” and not the right to

participate in each individual component o f that process. The Court Cited Dallam v.
Cumberland Valiev Sch. Dist. According to the Dallam court:
“The property interest in education created by the state is participation in the
entire process. The myriad activities which combine to form that educational
process cannot be dissected to create hundreds of separate property rights, each
cognizable under the Constitution. Otherwise, removal from a particular class,
dismissal from an athletic team, a club or any extracurricular activity, would each
require ultimate satisfaction o f procedural due process. (Mazevski v. Horseheads
Cent. Sch. Dist.. 1997 P. 72)”
Accordingly, the court reaffirmed Goss and Dallam by ruling that only exclusion from
the entire educational process requires implementation o f due process rights stipulated by
Goss.
Summary
Five cases relevant to this study from the 2"^ Circuit were briefed. Specifically,
all five from the U.S. District Court were examined for relevance. Furthermore, of the
five cases all were sided in favor of the Defendants.

Case Law (3"^ Circuit)
Case
Dallam v. Cumberland Valiev School Dist.. 391 F. Supp. 358, (M.D. Pa. 1975)
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Procedural Setting
3* Circuit - U.S. District Court / M.D.
Facts
George Dallam, a fifteen-year old plaintiff, transferred to Cumberland Valley
School District from the neighboring Camp Hill School District. Cumberland Valley is a
member o f the Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Association (P.I.A.A.). The
Association’s function is to develop and enforce uniform rules governing interscholastic
athletic competition among member schools. Dallam brought suit against Cumberland
Valley School District, in the Third Circuit District Court, due to a rule o f the P.I.A.A.
which, automatically bars a student from participation from interscholastic high school
athletic competition for one school year if a student transfers from one school district to
another, but does not reside in the transferee district with a parent or guardian.
The underlying objective o f the rule is to prohibit athletically motivated transfers
and high school athletic recruiting. The plaintiff argued that the automatic ineligibility
rule acts as an irrefutable presumption in violation o f his equal protection and due process
rights. The defendants concede that no hearing procedure is provided in which a student
could establish that he transferred for wholly non-athletic reasons, but following his
transfer, desired to participate in interseholastic athletics.
Holding
The District Court found itself without subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the
motion to dismiss was granted.
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Rationale of Holding
The Court held that the plaintiff mispereeived the issue. It is irrelevant whether
the plaintiffs participation in interscholastic athletics is either a right or privilege.

At

no time did the plaintiff point to any act o f Congress, which might serve as the basis for a
right or privilege. Instead, the plaintiff based his argument solely on the 14* Amendment
to the United States Constitution. Goss speaks in two ways. First, the Court speaks o f
the serious damage to the plaintiffs reputation because misconduct was allegedly the
basis for the suspension. Second, the Court looks at the nature o f the interest and not its
weight.
The plaintiff was not seeking instruction, or even participation in a particular area
of athletics. The record showed that the plaintiff had both instruction and athletic
competition available to him. The only avenue of athletics temporarily closed was the
opportunity to compete as a member o f a high school team against other high school
teams. The Court decided that there existed no constitutionally protected property
interest in competing for a place on a high school athletic team. Therefore, Goss which
protects the entire educational process had been complied with.
Case
Everett v. Marease, 426 F. Supp. 397, (E.D. Pa. 1977)
Procedural Setting
3"^ Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
Everett, a student in the School District of Philadelphia was transferred from his
school to another after being referred to the Principal’s Office numerous times for
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misconduct. Donna Everett brought suit against Michael Marease, Superintendent of the
School District o f Philadelphia, in the Third Circuit o f the United States District Court,
citing that transferring students to behavioral school as a result o f misconduct violated
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The School District o f Philadelphia mandated that a pupil
may not be suspended from school in excess o f five days unless precise “due process”
procedures are applied. The District entered a consent decree that approved extensive
procedures applicable to involuntary transfers o f pupils from a non-disciplinary public
school to a special disciplinary public school maintained by the School District. In the
past the District had conducted such transfers on an informal and largely ad hoc basis,
without precise internal guidelines.
The elass action was filed primarily to compel the School District to employ more
detailed and precise procedures for such transfers. The District throughout the litigation
took the legal position that the transfers require no due process procedural protections
because the transfer deprives a pupil o f no constitutionally cognizable property right and
does not amount to punishment. The district agreed that certain procedures could be
incorporated into a consent decree, which would be applied to all future involuntary
disciplinary transfers to non-diseiplinary school. Unfortunately, the parties could not
reach agreement as to certain issues that remained unsolved. They were: the right of the
pupil to be represented by legal counsel, designation o f the hearing officer or tribunal and
place o f hearing, right o f appeal from final decision to transfer, and the right o f pupils to
continue attending school pending final decision on the transfer.
Holding
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The Court ruled in part for both parties. With regard to legal counsel, the
designation o f the hearing offieer and / or hearing tribunal and place o f hearing, and the
right to appeal a final decision to transfer the Court ruled in favor o f the defendants.
However, the court felt that a transfer prior to final hearing, where there exists no
emergency situation, would appear to violate the due process prescribed.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court ruled that a transfer from one school to another within the same school
district does not reduce the educational opportunities of the transferred pupil. School
districts may assign pupils among its various schools as it deems appropriate and may,
for purely administrative purposes, assign pupils from one school to another. There is no
inherent right o f the pupil to attend the school o f his or her choice, or the choice o f the
parents, within the school district. However, an administrative transfer is vastly different
from a disciplinary transfer. The terminology o f “disciplinary” transfer suggests
punishment. Goss stated any disruption in primary or secondary education, whether by
suspension or involuntary transfer, is a loss of education benefits and opportunities.
The first unresolved issue is the right o f a pupil to be represented by legal counsel.
The Court found that there is no practical advantage to the pupil having the right to be
represented by an attorney at any informal hearing with the principal. The Court
continued by stating that there should be no prohibition against a principal permitting, in
his discretion, the attendance and advice o f counsel at such informal hearing. The Court
cited Dunmore v. Costanzo and Jones v. Gillespie that no specific mention is made as to
the right to counsel. In practice, attorneys may be permitted to represent pupils and
parents, but law does not mandate such requirement.
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The next unresolved area was the designation of the hearing officer and / or
hearing tribunal and place o f hearing. The plaintiffs contend that if the superintendent’s
office has the authority to choose the hearing officer, that person may be inclined to
“rubber stamp” the principal’s original decision o f disciplinary transfer. The Court
reaffirmed that the informal process in place throughout the country does not prohibit a
superior of the principal as the designated hearing officer. The Court concluded as to the
hearing officer, that it shall remain the responsibility of the School District to designate a
fair and impartial person or group o f persons to conduct the hearing and make a
determination. Furthermore, it is not for the federal courts to dictate the internal affairs
of local governmental agencies.
Concerning the unresolved question o f any right to appeal a final decision to
transfer, the Court affirmed that to provide a third-step hearing or right to appeal would
not appear to be a requirement o f due process. This, o f course, does not preclude any
party involved from calling upon any appropriate court of competent jurisdiction to
decide issues it may properly determine.
The final issue is the right o f the pupil to continue attending the school from
which he or she is proposed to be transferred pending final determination. The Court felt
that a transfer prior to final hearing, where there exists no emergency situation, would
appear to violate the due process prescribed. Therefore, with regard to Goss the Court
determined that students are to be given due process protection if the student is
transferred from one school to another for disciplinary reasons, but is not required for
non-disciplinary transfers.
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Case
Davis

V.

Central Dauphin School Dist. School Board. 466 F. Supp. 1259 (M.D. Pa. 1979)
Procedural Setting

3"^^ Circuit - U.S. District Court / M.D.
Facts
Davis was a member o f the senior class and a member o f the Varsity Basketball
team of Central Dauphin East High School. On January 30, 1979, Davis played in a
basketball game that was hotly contested and subsequently had a dispute in the locker
room with a fellow teammate. The dispute resulted in Davis striking Gregg Ludlam on
the jaw, which caused a compound fracture and hospitalization o f the victim.
On January 31, 1979, Dio K. Chamberlin, principal, held a conference and
advised Davis that he would be suspended from school attendance for a period o f one to
three days. Davis was given ample opportunity to present his version o f the incident.
The principal decided to impose an indefinite suspension from the basketball team
because of Davis’s conduct, which was unbecoming o f an athlete as pursuant to the
Athletic Association Policy o f the Central Dauphin School District adopted in August,
1975. The policy stated if a student’s “conduct unbecoming an athlete as determined by
the coach and principal shall become ineligible in all sports for a period o f 12 calendar
months from the day of dismissal.”
On February 1, 1979, a conference was held with Davis, his mother, and Ellis Van
Orman, Superintendent of Central Dauphin School District in Mr. Van Orman’s office at
which Davis related his version of the incident. The next day Davis was readmitted to
school and was suspended from the basketball team for the remainder of the season. Mrs.
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Davis, Russell’s mother, argued that her son was suspended from the basketball team
without any hearing in violation o f his constitutional rights to due process o f law. Davis
further argued that the defendants failed to furnish notice and a hearing. Russell Davis
brought suit against Central Dauphin School District in the Third Circuit of the District
Court in 1979, alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights.
Holding
The Court believed that Davis’s argument was without merit and the case was
dismissed.
Rationale o f Holding
The defendants contended that Davis was not deprived of a property interest,
which is protected by the due process clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
had the view that Davis had a reasonable expectation under the athletic policies that he
would be permitted to participate in high school athletics unless he violated the
provisions o f the athletic polices. At the very least, then, it is arguable that Davis had a
property interest in participating in high school athletics. After an independent review of
the statues o f the Pennsylvania, the Court was o f the view that the superintendent was
without authority to suspend Davis from the basketball team for the remainder of the
season. However, the court concluded that a fair reading o f the athletic policies
permitted the coach, with the approval o f the principal, to impose a suspension up to 12
months.
The Court would normally decide if due process rights were infringed upon,
however, since the court needed not to decide if property interest was created, due
process was received. Davis was aware of the charges and was given opportunity to
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respond. Therefore, the Court affirmed Goss by citing that no property interest is
afforded to students on athletic teams.
Case
Jordan v. School D ist.. 615 F.2d 85, (Pa. 1980)
Procedural Setting
S"' Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
Although the specific improprieties of Jordan were not detailed in the case, Jordan
V.

School Dist. occurred due to questions concerning the due process rights o f students

who were temporarily removed and transferred because o f behavioral problems in their
regularly assigned school to another school designed to meet the needs of such students.
Suit was filed by Jordan, in the Third Circuit Court o f Appeals in 1975, for incidents that
occurred in 1973. The question before the Court was whether the principles o f Goss v.
Lopez required any modification o f the decree, as originally drafted.
Flolding
The Court ruled in favor of the defendants and dismissed the suit in its entirety
since the Plaintiff was removed from school after receiving adequate procedural due
process.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court concluded that students faced with suspension from a public school
have property and liberty interest that qualify for protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court held that, “the student (must) be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation o f the evidence the
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authorities have and an opportunity to present his side o f the story.” The plaintiffs argued
that the case was not about disciplinary suspension but rather disciplinary transfer. A
consent decree was rendered and stated in part:
“When a student faces removal from his regularly assigned classroom, and the
consequential recommendation for transfer, the consent decree requires the
principal to give written notice to both the student and his parent in person or by
certified mail detailing the reasons for the proposed transfer. Furthermore, the
provisions o f the consent decree provide for an informal meeting between the
student, his agents, and the principal before the transfer, as well as two formal
hearings at which evidence may be presented and witnesses examined. (Jordan v.
School Dist.. 1980 P. 87)”
The Court found that the decree clearly exceeded the rudimentary precautions
required by Goss. Although there was no provision in the consent decree for notice or a
hearing before a disruptive or dangerous student is physically removed from class, Goss
indicated none is required as long as such removal is followed by appropriate notice and
hearings, as was the case in Jordan v. School Dist.
According to the decree; a student who is non-disruptive or does not pose a
continuing danger to persons or property could be removed from the classroom without
notice or opportunity to explain his version o f the occurrence at an informal meeting.
Therefore, the Court added that a person who is non-disruptive or does not pose a
continuing danger could not be removed until after notice o f proposed action and basis
therefore and opportunity to explain.
The Third Circuit District Court o f Appeals modified the original order and
directed the addition of paragraph 32 and the deletion of paragraphs 33 and 34. The court
also held that the relevance o f Goss did not apply since the argument at hand was
involuntary transfer as opposed to suspension.
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Case
White

V.

Salisbury Township School Dist., 588 F. Supp. 608, (E.D. Pa. 1984)
Procedural Setting

3^ Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On February 1, 1980, an officer o f the Salisbury Township Police Department
conducted a surprise raid at the high school for the purpose o f confiscating drugs and
paraphernalia. The target o f the police was a group o f students who regularly gathered
outside the gymnasium doors each morning. Twenty-one students, including the
plaintiffs, were arrested, taken inside the gymnasium, and searched. Although the police
found marijuana and various articles o f drug paraphernalia on a number of the students,
no contraband was found on the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were directed to sign an
attendance sheet and then report to their regularly scheduled classes. No disciplinary
action was taken on that date.
Mr. White and Mr. Rappaport were told of the arrests and searches, which had
taken place at the high school, and demanded information with respect to the arrest of
their sons. Mr. White went to the police office and saw video surveillance, which
purported to show David and Peter in the group of students smoking marijuana. He was
also informed that several officers had observed his sons smoking.
On February 4, 1980, Mario Donnangelo, Principal, was given a report from the
police department and immediately began to hold informal conferences with the students
named in the report. The students were informed that they could attend the remainder of
their classes, but could not come to class the next day and were to attend suspension
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hearings as a result o f information provided school officials in the police report. Oral
notification o f the hearing was ultimately given to all involved students. David White
was absent from school on February 4, 1980, and although was not personally notified of
the hearing to be held on February 5, 1980, both his brother and mother were notified and
they passed the information to him and his father. Mr. White and Mr. Rappaport retained
counsel for their sons. On February 5, 1980, the District was made aware that the
W hite’s and the Rappaport’s had retained counsel. Therefore, the hearing was postponed
until February 6, 1980 with the school and both families.
During the hearings, testimony was presented by the police officer involved and
photographs were shown. The plaintiffs in their own behalf presented no testimony. At
the conclusion o f the hearing, a ten-day suspension was formally imposed. The school
also explained that the suspension would not be made part o f any o f the student’s
permanent record. David White, Peter White and Eric Rappaport, brought suit against
the Salisbury Township School District and the Salisbury Township Board of Education
in the Third Circuit District Court for imposing suspensions on them without affording
them due process o f law. The relevant facts were not seriously disputed.
Holding
The Court felt that the one-day delay o f the hearing was in many ways attributable
to the plaintiffs themselves and subsequently ruled in favor o f the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court ruled that the plaintiffs were orally notified o f the charges against them
and o f the suspension hearing being held in connection with those charges, thereby.
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complying with the notice requirements o f Goss. There was a dispute as to whether the
suspensions were imposed prior to or subsequent to the hearings. The Court ruled that
although the plaintiffs were not afforded their right to a hearing prior to suspension, Goss
points out that a hearing prior to suspension is merely a general rule to be followed
particularly where the student’s removal from school occurs “almost immediately
following the misconduct.” However, the school allowed the students to attend school
for the remainder o f the day on February 1, 1980. Therefore, the Court reaffirmed Goss
by ruling in favor o f the defendants.
Case
Palmer v. M erluzzi. 868 F.2d 90, (N.J. 1989)
Procedural Setting
3"^ Circuit - Court o f Appeals / N.J.
Facts
Daniel Palmer was a senior at Hunterdon Central High School in September o f 1986.
He was also the starting wide receiver on the school’s football team and enrolled in a
course titled “Careers Broadcasting Technology.” On September 28, 1986, Palmer and
three other students were assigned to the school radio station which was located on the
school’s property. The next morning, beer stains and a marijuana pipe were found at the
radio station. Later that same day. Dr. Grimm, school disciplinarian, and Palmer’s
football coach, met with Palmer at which time Daniel Palmer admitted to smoking
marijuana the night before while at the radio station.
On September 30, 1986, Dr. Grimm sent a letter advising Palmer and his family
that Daniel had been placed on a ten-day suspension. The Palmer’s took no action to
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contest the suspension. The Superintendent, Merluzzi, imposed a sixty-day suspension
from interscholastic activities to all students involved in the incident approximately ten
calendar days later. Mr. Palmer, Daniel’s father, heard that rumors that the additional
penalties were to be imposed and subsequently attended a Board o f Education meeting on
October 13, 1986.
The Palm er’s then brought suit stating that it was the ninth day o f the school
suspension before any mention o f additional penalties were announced. Thus Palmer
alleged that the defendants violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment when they suspended Palmer from participating in extracurricular activities
for sixty-days without notice and a hearing. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the grounds that New Jersey and the majority o f jurisdictions do not
recognize a student’s property interest in extracurricular activities, and there being no
property interest. Palmer was not entitled to due process protection before the suspension
was imposed.
Holding
The Court ordered that the plaintiffs complaint be dismissed because
extracurricular activities do not fall under the scope of property interests.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court cited that “Legitimate claim o f entitlement to a specific government
benefit and not an abstract need or desire or a unilateral expectation” clearly gave Palmer
a claimed property interest and entitlement to a public education (Board o f Regents v.
Roth 408 U.S. 564 1972 P. 577). In Burnside v. N.J.S.A. the students claimed that they
had a constitutional right to participate on their high school’s interscholastic athletic
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teams. The Appellate Division disagreed. It found that “While extracurricular activities,
including interscholastic athletics, are important factors toward a sound and
comprehensive academic education, it emphasized that each pupil does not have a right to
participate in interscholastic athletics.”
The District Court stated, “Federal courts are not super referees over high school
athletic programs.” Therefore, the District Court ordered that the plaintiffs complaint be
dismissed. However, it should be noted that although the complaint was dismissed, the
Administrative Law Judge stated,
“This eleven hour, additional penalty, coming without official notice and without
any chance to be heard, flies in the face o f all notions o f fundamental fairness.
Because I believe Superintendent M erluzzi acted in a wholly arbitrary manner in
taking away a protected property interest and what may have been Palmer’s only
avenue to higher education, I respectfully dissent.” (Palmer v. Merluzzi. 1989 Pp.
92-93)

Although the plaintiffs’ cited Goss, the case at hand merely reaffirmed Goss by
establishing the fact that the intent of Goss was to protect the entire educational process.
Judge Fisher, relying on New Jersey law, found that high school students do not have a
property interest in playing football and, therefore, may be dismissed from a team
without due process. Specifically, Judge Fisher held:
“As Roth indicates, any analysis concerning whether interscholastic
athletics are protected should in the first instance be made by reference to
state law. 408 U.S. at 577. In Dennis v. Holmdel Bd. o f Ed., 1977 School
Law Decision 388, New Jersey's Commissioner o f Education stated,
"Participation in interscholastic athletics is a privilege which is subject to
rules made by local boards of education". The Third Circuit has also held
that a "right" to play basketball did not rise to the level o f a specific
constitutional guarantee.” (Palmer v. Merluzzi. 1989 P. 98)
Therefore, extracurricular activities are not a property protected interest. Since
extracurricular activities do not fall under a protected property interest deprivation of
these “extra interests” are not protected by Goss.
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Case
Giangrasso v. Kittatinny Regional High Sch. Bd. o f Educ., 865 F. Supp. 1133, (D.N.J.
1994)
Procedural Setting
3'^‘*Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.J.
Facts
On October 30, 1989, Giangrasso, a student at Kittatinny High School, was
sleeping in class and when awoken by Ms. Kesselman, his teacher, he threatened to
punch her in the head. Giangrasso’s claims were identical in nature to Kesselman’s with
the exception that he claimed that Kesselman jerked his head back to awaken him.
Witnesses in the classroom collaborated Kesselman’s version.
Ms. Kapler, Assistant Principal, confronted Giangrasso with the evidence and
informed him that he would be suspended for five-days. Immediately after conducting
the hearing, Giangrasso’s parents were informed. Giangrasso’s stepfather arrived at
school to take him home and was also explained the charges against his stepson, the
evidence, and the reasons for his suspension.
On November 1, 1989, the plaintiff was placed on homebound instruction,
pending the result o f a psychiatric review. On December 20, 1989, the plaintiffs Child
Study Team mailed Giangrasso’s Individualized Education Plan that terminated the
homebound instruction and directed that Giangrasso be returned to mainstream
schooling. Four other potential special education placements were also presented.
Giangrasso was subsequently accepted at High Point Regional High School in a special
education program with a work-study component. Subsequently, Giangrasso brought suit
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against Kittatinny Regional High School Board o f Education in the Third Circuit District
Court.
Holding
The Court ruled in favor of the defendants by dismissing all claims because the
jurisprudence outline in Goss v. Lopez was strictly adhered to.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court found that the due process afforded to Giangrasso was in line with
Goss and ordered that the plaintiffs attorney Edward J. Gaffney, Jr., Esq. Pay to the
defendants $100,000 and ordered that all claims be dismissed. Therefore, since
Giangrasso was informed o f the charges against him, given the opportunity to tell his side
of the story, and presented with his due process rights, the Court reaffirmed Goss.
Case
Bartram v. Pennsburv Sch. Dist.. 1999 U.S. Dist. (E.D. Pa. May 24, 1999)
Procedural Setting
S"' Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
Bartram was a tenth grade student at Pennsbury High School in Bucks County,
Pennsylvania. On April 24, 1998, Bartram drove him self and three other students to
school later than the starting time of school. Bartram and one o f his passengers did not
go to the attendance office as required when tardy to school because they were afraid of
missing the field trip to the Great Adventure Theme Park.
A teacher, Sanchez, who asked them to breathe on him, confronted Bartram and
the other student. He stated that they smelled like “pot” / marijuana. Mr. Knight
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confirmed Mr. Sanchez’s suspicion and informed Bartram and his friend that they were
on suspension and then took them to his office. The plaintiff claimed that they were,
“standing out in a field next to some kids that were smoking pot.” Based upon the strong
odor o f marijuana, Mr. Knight searched the plaintiff and his friend. The plaintiff was
informed that he would be suspended for three-days and that depending on the outcome
of an informal hearing; he could be suspended for seven more days. Katz also informed
Bartram that he would not pursue further disciplinary action if he revealed the names o f
the people who were smoking pot.
Bartram’s mother called Mr. Knight in order to find an explanation for her son’s
suspension. Mr. Knight explained that her son was being suspended because he had,
“either been smoking pot or had been around someone who was smoking pot for an
extended period o f time.” Mr. Knight then tried to schedule an informal hearing and Mrs.
Bartram refused to cooperate and instead, demanded a letter advising her o f the
suspension. Mrs. Bartram took her son for a drug test and the results indicated that he
was drug free. That same day, she received a letter from Mr. Knight explaining her son’s
three-day suspension, which also scheduled an informal hearing for April 29^.
During the hearing, Bartram admitted to being around students who were smoking
but denied that he was smoking. Mr. Katz ultimately decided to allow Bartram to return
to school the following day. The Bartram’s alleged that “despite knowing o f the drug test
and the fact that it was entirely and completely negative, the school district has refused to
amend the improper suspension.” Subsequently, Mary Bartram, on behalf o f her son,
Neal Bartram, brought suit against Pennsbury School District, William Katz / principal,
Charles Knight / assistant principal, and Ray Sanchez / teacher in the Third Circuit
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District Court after Neal was suspended from school for three-days for smelling like
marijuana.
Holding
The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and the cased was
closed after the District Court found that Bartram was afforded procedural due process as
dictated by Goss v. Lopez.
Rationale o f Holding
The District Court found that the plaintiff was suspended from school for a total
of three days. Thus, the due process requirements under Goss are applicable in this case.
Applying these standards, it was clear to the Court that the plaintiff was afforded all of
the process to which he was entitled under the circumstances pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Since the negative drug test was not available to the defendants at the time
o f the suspension, the Court held that it could not have been a factor in the school’s
decision to send him home. The District Court found;
“The undisputed facts reveal that at the April 24th meeting. Plaintiff was notified
that he was being suspended for violating the school policy against using drugs
and was provided the opportunity to explain his side o f the facts. Plaintiff was
informed by both Mr. Knight and Mr. Katz that the accusation was derived from
his late arrival to school, the odor o f marijuana emanating from him, and his
admission that he stood around people who were smoking marijuana. Mr. Katz
also showed Plaintiff a copy o f the Student Conduct Policy and the relevant
provision in question. Pursuant to the school's distribution o f the policy, it can be
inferred that Plaintiff possessed a copy o f the policy. Indeed, Plaintiff never
denies being aware o f the policy provision in question. Finally, Mr. Katz asked
for, and received. Plaintiffs version o f the incident. Plaintiffs mother was then
apprised o f the situation through telephone conversations and letters. An informal
hearing was conducted immediately after Plaintiffs three-day suspension where,
again. Plaintiff was provided with notice and an opportunity to be heard.”
’’Moreover, this suspension procedure was neither negated nor undermined by
Plaintiffs subsequent drug test indicating a negative result. As the test was not
available to Defendants at the time Plaintiff was suspended, it could not have been
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a factor in the school officials' decision to send Plaintiff home, and consequently,
cannot give rise to a procedural due process infirmity. Furthermore, procedural
due process challenges based on the Pennsylvania Constitution are evaluated
under the same standards as under the federal constitution.”
’’Accordingly, as Plaintiff was afforded adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard, he has failed to meet his burden o f showing that Defendants' conduct
violated a clearly established constitutional right.” (Bartram v. Pennsburv Sch.
Dist.. 1999 P. 8)
Case
Brian A. v. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist.. 141 F. Supp. 2d 502, (M.D. Pa. 2001)
Procedural Setting
S"* Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
Brian was a fifteen-year old tenth grade student who relocated sometime in March
of 1999 from New Jersey to the Stroudsburg area with his family. On or about April 27,
1999, Brian wrote a note that stated, “There’s a Bomb in tbis School bang bang! !” and
left it on a table in his art class. Brian A. contended that the note was written as a joke
for two girls in his class and that he forgot to throw it away after class. Brian A .’s
teacher found the note and brought it to the attention o f the administration and school
police. Brian was questioned about the note. Subsequently, Brian admitted to writing the
note and to blowing up a shed while being on probation in New Jersey. Brian later stated
that they, “just kept badgering me about it, and then 1just ended up admitting it.” Brian’s
father was called and requested to come to the school.
Brian and his father were informed that Brian would be suspended for ten-days
for making terroristic threats. A letter was sent to Brian’s parents informing them that
Brian was suspended from school for ten-days “for the following reason: bomb threat to
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school.” A few days later, Brian A .’s father again met with the school administration and
was informed that Brian would not be reeeiving credit for the tenth grade. The plaintiff s
father then met with the superintendent and was allegedly told that no charge would be
brought against Brian A. if he were to withdraw him from school. A letter dated June 2,
1999, advised Brian’s parents that he was recommended for expulsion and that the
proceeding would be initiated if he were not voluntarily withdrawn from school. The
letter acknowledged that Brian had signed a sworn statement indicating that he had never
previously been suspended. The letter also outlined the previous incident that took place
in New Jersey.
A letter advised the plaintiff and his family that an expulsion hearing would be
held on June 14, 1999.

The hearing was held without the plaintiff. Brian A .’s father

stated that he did not attend the hearing because his counsel could not be present.
Subsequently, Brian was permanently expelled from the Stroudsburg Area High School.
Finally, Brian finished tenth grade through home schooling and was then enrolled in the
eleventh grade at Bethesda, an alternative school at the District’s cost. Subsequently,
Brian A. brought civil rights action on August 4, 1999, in the Third Circuit U.S. District
Court against the Stroudsburg Area School District and Robert L. McGraw,
superintendent. The plaintiff alleged that various constitutional rights violations arose
from his suspension and later expulsion from the Stroudsburg High School.
Holding
The Court dismissed the plaintiffs claims without prejudice after it was
determined by the District Court that Brian was provided the proeess that was due under
Goss.
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Rationale of Holding
The Court held that the school officials, with regard to the suspension, provided
the process that was due under Goss. Furthermore, the plaintiffs were given ample
opportunity to attend the expulsion hearing on June 14, 1999, and failed to attend.
Therefore despite the fact that the hearing was not convenient for the plaintiffs, they were
afforded full due process.
Summary
Nine cases relevant to this study from the 3'^'^ Circuit were briefed. Specifically,
seven from the U.S. District Court and two from the U.S. 3"^ Circuit Court o f Appeals
were examined for relevance. Furthermore, o f the nine cases all but one were sided in
favor o f the Defendants (Everett v. Marcase. 1997).

Case Law (4**^ Circuit)
Case
Baker v. Owen. 395 F. Supp. 294, (M.D.N.C. 1975)
Procedural Setting
4**^ Circuit - U.S. District Court / M.D.
Facts
The facts of the case arose when Russell Carl Baker was paddled on December 6,
1973, for allegedly violating his teacher’s announced rule against throwing kickballs
except during designated play periods. Mrs. Baker had previously requested that her son
not be corporally punished. However, shortly after the alleged misconduct her son
received two licks in the presence of a second teacher and in view o f other students.
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Mrs. Baker stated that the administration o f the corporal punishment violated her
parental right to determine disciplinary methods for her child. Russell notified Owen that
the circumstances in which the punishment was administered violated his right to
procedural due process and that the punishment itself amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment. The Baker’s further claimed that the statue, which empowers school
officials to, “use reasonable force in the exercise o f lawful authority to restrain or correct
pupil and to maintain order,” was unconstitutional because it allowed corporal
punishment over parental objection and absence of adequate o f procedural safeguards.
Subsequently, Russell Carl Baker and his mother filed suit against W.C. Owen, Principal
of Gibsonville School, stating that Russell’s constitutional rights were violated when his
teacher corporally punished him over his mother’s objections and without procedural due
process.
Holding
The District Court ruled in favor o f the defendants after deciding that the
plaintiffs due process rights were not violated.
Rationale o f Holding
The Court held that the North Carolina general Statutes (1 1 5 - 146) were not
unconstitutional. They also held that to implement the statue without giving students
procedural due process would be a violation o f the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore,
the District Court suggested minimal procedures would satisfy fhe Fourteenth
Amendment, and that nothing is intended to prevent or dissuade the state from further
elaboration upon necessary requirements in order to accomplish fairness in administration
of schools. Finally, the District Court ruled that based on the facts o f the case, the
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punishment o f Russell Carl Baker was not cruel and unusual within the meaning o f the
eighth amendment.
The District Court held that Fourteenth Amendment liberty embraces the right of
parents to control the means o f discipline of their children, but that the state has a
countervailing interest in the maintenance o f order in the schools. In this particular case
the law was sufficient to sustain the right o f teachers and school officials to administer
reasonable corporal punishment for disciplinary purposes and that teachers and school
officials must accord to students a minimal procedural due process in the course of
inflicting such punishment. This was based upon the North Carolina General Statue
(115-146), which read as follows:
“Duties o f teachers generally; principals and teachers may use reasonable force
in exercising lawful authority. —It shall be the duty o f all teachers, including
student teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, teachers' aides and
assistants when given authority over some part o f the school program by the
principal or supervising teacher, to maintain good order and discipline in their
respective schools; to encourage temperance, morality, industry, and neatness; to
promote the health of all pupils, especially o f children in the first three grades, by
providing frequent periods o f recreation, to supervise the play activities during
recess, and to encourage wholesome exercises for all children; to teach as
thoroughly as they are able all branches which they are required to teach; to
provide for singing in the school, and so far as possible to give instruction in the
public school music; and to enter actively into the plans o f the superintendent for
the professional growth o f the teaehers. (North Carolina Statues, 1975 P. 115)”
Principals, teachers, substitute teachers, voluntary teachers, teachers' aids and
assistants and student teachers in the public schools o f this State may use
reasonable force in the exercise o f lawful authority to restrain or correct pupils
and maintain order. No county or city board o f education or district committee
shall promulgate or continue in effect a rule, regulation or bylaw that prohibits the
use o f such force as is specified in this section. (North Carolina Statues, 1975 P.
146)”
Defendants argued that school officials can corporally punish pupils over parental
objections without antecedent procedural safeguards. The Defendants also cited statue as
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authority for their position, thus there was no dispute that they had authority under the
statue to engage in such practice. The basis of the challenge was that the cited statute
allowed the power to administer corporal punishment and suspend pupils without
procedural safeguards. The District Court saw no difference between Baker v. Owens
and Goss and therefore rejected the Defendants’ claim.
The District Court agreed with Mrs. Baker that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
concept of liberty embraced the right o f a parent to determine and choose between means
o f discipline of children, but few constitutional rights are absolute. The Court also
rejected Mrs. Baker’s suggestion that her right was fundamental, and that the state can
punish her child corporally only if it showed a compelling interest that outweighed her
parental right.
Different consideration came into play with Baker’s claim that the statue allowed
corporal punishment without due process. The District Court believed that Russell Carl
Baker had an interest, protected by the concept of liberty in the fourteenth amendment, in
avoiding corporal punishment. The announced possibility o f corporal punishment and an
attempt to modify behavior by some other means would insure that the child had clear
notice that certain behavior would subject him to physical punishment. The student need
not be afforded a formal opportunity to present his side to a second school official (who
must be present and be informed o f the reason for the punishment.) The official who had
administered the punishment must only provide the child’s parent, upon request, a written
explanation o f the reasons and the name o f the second official who was present.
Therefore, the Court ruled that under the constitution the school had legally sufficient
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authority to administer the corporal punishment without satisfying the stipulations of
Goss.
Case
Hillman V. Elliott. 436 F. Supp. 812, (W.D. Va. 1977)
Procedural Setting
4'^ Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
On November 2, 1976, David Hillman was a student at Gate High School in Gate
City, Virginia, when he was charged with being disrespectful to a teacher and when he
used abusive language to his fellow students. That same day, the plaintiffs parents
received notice o f the plaintiffs three-day suspension by the school’s principal. Hillman
admitted that he had used abusive language to at least one student. The school board
notified the parents o f a hearing on the recommended suspension to be held on November
30, 1976. Hillman and his parents failed to attend the hearing and subsequently the board
upheld the reeommendation for suspension.
Due to the fact that the Defendants’ were uncertain about whether they had
followed their disciplinary code regulations for suspending a student, they started the
disciplinary process over by notifying the plaintiffs parents by letter, which was dated
January 4, 1977. The letter also advised o f a hearing to be held in the principal’s office.
After the hearing, the principal suspended Hillman for three days subject to appeal. The
Hillman’s made their due proeess objections and then withdrew David from school, at
which time the suspension was upheld. The plaintiff and his parents appealed to the Scott
County School Board and only made due process objections before walking out. After
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being notified that the Board had upheld the suspension, the plaintiff s filed suit in the
court.
Holding
The Court found that the plaintiff was afforded due process as required by Goss.
by substantially complying with their disciplinary rules o f suspension, which went well
beyond the constitutional minimum, and satisfied the due process clause. Therefore, the
Court denied the relief requested by the plaintiffs.
Rationale o f Holding
The first issue confronted by the Court was whether the rule enunciated by Goss
V.

Lopez is applicable to a three-day suspension from school. The Court in Goss held

that a ten-day suspension from school is not de minimis. . .and may not be imposed in
complete disregard o f the Due Process Clause. The issue turned on whether or not a
three-day suspension is de minimis. Although the Court recognized that expulsion from
the educational process for more than a trivial period is a serious event in the life of a
suspended child, it also found that a three-day suspension is not de minimis and therefore,
due process was required in the suspension o f Hillman.
Having decided that due process was entitled, the Court determined that the
plaintiff and his parents received written notice o f the charges, were advised of the
hearing, and had the right to a representative. The Plaintiff s, however, alleged that the
due process afforded after January 1977, did not cure the taint, a neutral hearing officer
was not assigned, and that the Defendants failed to follow their own rules for suspending
a student.

Ill
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The Court ruled that the Plaintiff did have notice and a hearing in the early stages
of the proceedings at which time the Plaintiff admitted to having used abusive language
to one student. Courts have indicated that due process in the school setting does not have
to adhere to prescribed patterns. Since Hillman admitted to violating a rule, no time
elapsed between giving notice and holding and therefore, did not raise procedural
problems. No real evidence was presented to indicate that the principal was biased.
Hillman contended that while he was advised of the rules he was charged with having
violated, he was never advised of the “facts and circumstances surrounding the
violation.” According to Goss, a student must only be advised o f the charges against
him. Finally, on three occasions, the plaintiffs had the opportunity to find the specifics of
the charges but instead chose to walk out o f the proceedings.
Case
Pegram v. Nelson. 469 F. Supp. 1134, (M.D.N.C. 1979)
Procedural Setting
4*'' Circuit - U.S. District Court / N.C.
Facts
On January 26, 1976, Alvin Long, Wayne Botts, and Pegram attended a
basketball game at Northeast Junior High, in Greensboro, North Carolina. Pegram was
fourteen years old and in the ninth grade. Mrs. Jean Trantham discovered that her
billfold, which contained about $65, had been stolen and informed the Defendant, Nelson
/ Principal about the theft. She also stated that the Plaintiff and the other two boys had
been sitting behind her. She further explained that all three boys had left the gymnasium
just before she noticed that her billfold was missing. Pegram and his two friends were
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detained at which point Botts and Long handed over $42. Pegram was searched,
however, no money was found.
Long and Botts wrote written statements that detailed how Pegram had stolen the
money. The billfold was recovered and Nelson continued his interview o f Pegram.
Pegram’s father was notified by phone and arrived at the school shortly thereafter.
Pegram continued to deny his part in the theft and was informed the following day at
school that he would be suspended, beginning January 29, for ten school days, and that he
would not be allowed on school grounds after 3:15 p.m. for the remainder o f the school
year. The plaintiffs parents received a letter from Nelson, dated January 28, 1976,
informing them that:
“ .. .your son is suspended from Northeast Junior High School for ten school days,
starting on January 29, 1976. He may return to school on Thursday, February 12,
1976. Also, Lawrence is not to be on the Northeast Junior High School grounds
except during regular school hours. He may not attend any after school activities.
This is to be for the remainder o f the 1 9 7 5 -7 6 school year. (Pegram v. Nelson.
1979 P. 1137)”
Pegram’s father met with Nelson after reading the letter in order to discuss the
incident. At that meting, Mr. Pegram offered the names o f four students who might have
had evidence bearing on the incident. After interviewing the students. Nelson contacted
Pegram’s father and notified him that the information obtained did not alter his findings.
Holding
The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment was denied after sufficient
evidence that Pegram had been afforded his proeedural due process and therefore, the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted.
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Rationale o f Holding
The Supreme Court cited Goss as the leading case on the applicability o f due
process to student diseipline. The Court held that the student had a “legitimate
entitlement to a public education.” The Court also found that an informal hearing is
sufficient when a student is given a short suspension that does not exceed ten-days.
On the day o f the incident, the principal told the Plaintiff o f the accusations and
gave him an opportunity to respond. Therefore, Pegram was given due process rights that
were fully in accord with Goss. The Plaintiff, however, was issued a second penalty. He
was not allowed on school grounds after regular school hours for a period o f four months.
The Court held that participation in interscholastic sports or extracurricular
activities is not, by and in itself a property interest. The Court cited Colorado Seminary
V.

N.C.A.A.. Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association. Dallam v.

Cumberland Valiev School District. Tavlor v. Alabama High School Athletic
Association. Denis J. O ’Connell High School v. Virginia High School League, and
Bishop

V.

Wood, with regard to its decision. Since there was not a property interest,

denial to participate in one or several extracurricular activities did not give rise to a right
to due process. Therefore, the Plaintiff was not precluded from participating in all
extracurricular activities, but only those occurring after school for a period o f four
months. (Pegram v. Nelson. 1979 Pp. 1139 - 1141)
Case
Doe

V.

Rockingham Countv School Bd.. 658 L. Supp. 403, (W.D. Va. 1987)
Procedural Setting

4'"^ Circuit - U.S. District Court
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Facts
John Doe was an eight-year old third grader at Bridgewater Elementary School.
“John, Jr. had long been a diseiplinary problem and had been involved in a series o f
incidents which were both disruptive and somewhat violent.” (Doe, 1987) Affidavits
indicate that he had long been a disciplinary problem, which had caused school officials
to consider a transfer to another school until the precipitating occurrence. While D oe’s
actions were not life threatening, and his stature was small enough to permit him to be
physically restrained, he periodically engaged himself in verbal and physical temper
tantrums, which included kicking, scratching, and hitting teachers and students. After a
severe incident on January 9, 1986, Doe was suspended for 35 days from school, from
January 10 to February 13, 1986 (the next board hearing).
The plaintiffs mother contacted the superintendent and Doe was reinstated on
January 13, 1986. Two days later another disruptive incident occurred and Doe was
again suspended. The school board refused to grant a hearing until the next school board
hearing. On January 20, 1986, a licensed psychologist determined that Doe suffered from
a learning disability. The school stated that diagnosis o f Doe would begin on February 3,
1986. After being informed o f the diagnosis, Mr. Pellman refused to reinstate John, Jr.
and the parents were urged to consider homebound instruction. Subsequently, this action
was brought on behalf o f a learning disabled child, “John Doe” by his parent, seeking the
child’s readmission to school during the pendency o f a twenty-nine-day suspension from
school for disciplinary problems.
Holding
The Court ruled that by applying the standard o f Goss, the plaintiffs right to a
due process hearing had been violated.
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Rationale o f Holding
On February 4, 1986, the plaintiff filed the instant cause o f action seeking a
temporary restraining order to force John, Jr.’s readmission to school and to order further
procedural due process. In a hearing conducted on February 6, 1986, the Court granted
the plaintiffs motion. On February 18, 1986, John Jr. was reinstated at Pleasant Valley
Elementary School.
Under Virginia’s statutory law schools were allowed to suspend students up to a
period of thirty days pending a decision by the school. Furthermore, the law of the
Commonwealth o f Virginia did not contemplate a hearing within 72 hours, and could in
fact he read to mean that suspensions could continue during the pendency o f committee
hearing and an appeal to the full school board for a period not to exceed 30 days after the
committed hearing. It was noted that the complaint indicated that the school officials
talked to John Sr. on January 15, 1986, however it was not contended by defendants that
the brief encounter constituted a hearing for due process purposes. Thus, applying the
standard o f Goss, the plaintiffs right to a due process hearing had been violated.
“The plaintiff has due process rights, since Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 42 L. Ed.
2d 725, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975), indicates that a disciplinary suspension for even a
normal child creates more than a de minimis liberty interest for a school child.
Under Goss, the plaintiff would be entitled to notice and at least an informal
hearing at which he could give his version o f the events. See Goss, supra, at 58284. For even a 10-day suspension, the court stated that in certain cases the school
official "may then determine him self to summon the accuser, permit crossexamination, and allow the student to present his own witnesses. In more difficult
cases, he may permit counsel." Id. at 584. The Supreme Court also notes that
longer suspensions "may require more formal procedures." Id. In this case, the
parents of John, Jr. clearly had ample notice o f the reasons for the suspension
from school officials. When the plaintiffs father picked John, Jr. up from school
on January 15, 1986, he spoke with Mr. Dishner. Mr. Doe was told that "John, Jr.
was suspended from school until February 13 at which time the School Board
would meet to consider the child's return to school." Complaint at p. 4. It then
becomes necessary to decide whether this brief meeting constituted a due process
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hearing, whether the plaintiff was under a duty to request further due process, and
whether the school was under an obligation to furnish the plaintiff with
information regarding what further due process remedies were available, in order
to decide whether the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies.
”It is clear that when a student's conduct disrupts the academic atmosphere o f the
school and endangers fellow students, teachers, or school officials, or damages
property, the Supreme Court opinion in Goss, at 572, requires that notice of
suspension proceedings be sent to the student's parents and that a hearing be held,
with the student present, "as soon as practicable." Id. at 583. In Goss, the Supreme
Court affirmed a district court opinion which specified that notice should be
usually given within 24 hours and that a hearing should be held within 72 hours.
Clearly Goss did not contemplate that a due process hearing 29 days later would
be adequate. (Doe v. Rockingham Countv School Bd. 1987 P. 407)”
Under due process considerations, failure on the part of school authorities to
afford a hearing is not excused by later proof that the student is guilty o f the offense as
charged. Thus, the necessity o f a prompt hearing is a constitutional prerequisite, as set
forth in Goss, despite the fact the Virginia’s statutory law allowed suspensions to remain
in effect for a period o f up to 30-days pending decision by a school board.
Case
Broussard v. School Bd. o f Norfolk. 801 F. Supp. 1526, (E.D. Va. 1992)
Procedural Setting
4'*’ Circuit - U.S. District Court
Facts
The facts o f this case stemmed from Kimberly Ann Broussard’s refusal to change
out o f a shirt printed with the words “Drugs Suck” and was subsequently placed on a oneday suspension. Furthermore, Broussard claimed that she was deprived of her right to
due process by being suspended summarily, without according her notice or an
opportunity to be heard.
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The school’s administration found the shirt inappropriate for school due to the
word “Suck” and asked the plaintiff if she had another shirt, if she could borrow a shirt,
or if she would turn the shirt inside out for the day in which she refused all three options.
Broussard’s mother was contacted and she informed the administration that she would
have her husband bring a shirt as soon as possible. Five hours later, the plaintiffs
stepfather arrived with another shirt. Mr. Caprio, school administrator, explained in front
of the plaintiffs that Broussard could either change her shirt or go home for the
remainder o f the day. Mr. Lord, stepfather, had the impression that she was suspended if
she did not change the shirt, even if she went home for the remainder of the day.
Later the same day, Mr. Lord contacted the school and inquired if his daughter
had been suspended at which time he was informed that she had not been. He replied that
Broussard would return to school wearing the “Drugs Suck” shirt. The Principal stated,
“in that case she is suspended.” Mrs. Lord said that she would return to school to obtain
a suspension notice, which according to both parties occurred. Broussard’s parents
followed the chain o f command with respect to appeal for suspension and contacted Dr.
Carter who stated that he would not reverse the principal’s decision and wrote:
“Clothing containing messages couched in strong language is inappropriate,
especially when the language has an overt sexual connotation. Such messages are
even more likely to be disruptive when directed at adolescents as opposed to
mature adults. (Broussard v. School Bd. o f Norfolk. 1992 P. 1503)”
Subsequently, this action was brought by Kimberly Ann Broussard against the
School Board o f the City of Norfolk based on assertions that school administrators
violated her Fourteenth and First Amendment rights.
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Holding
The Court found in favor o f the Defendants due process claim since the Plaintiff
was given notice and opportunity to be heard.
Rationale o f Holding
The Plaintiffs did not appeal to the school board, the next level of appeal, but
instead, with the support of the American Civil Liberties Union, filed a civil rights action.
The Court ruled that Broussard and her parents had received notice that the shirt she wore
to school violated school rules. Furthermore, the District Court cited Goss by stating
that, “due process requires that a student facing suspension o f ten days or less must
receive oral or written notice o f the charge against her and an opportunity to present her
story. No waiting period between the misconduct and the hearing is required.” Finally,
the Court found that prior to her one-day suspension, Broussard received adequate notice
o f the conduct that the school found in violation o f school rules, that Broussard and her
father had adequate opportunity to rebut the school administrators’ finding that the shirt
was inappropriate attire for school, and the plaintiff rejected the opportunity to avoid
suspension either by changing the shirt or by voluntarily going home for the remainder of
the day.
Case
Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch.. 16 Fed. Appx. 140, (4^'’ Cir. 2001)
Procedural Setting
4^*^ Circuit - Court of Appeals
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Facts
In October 1999, Benjamin Ratner, was thirteen-years old and in the eighth grade
at Blue Ridge Middle School in Loudoun County, Virginia. On October 8, 1999, a
schoolmate told Ratner that she had been suicidal the previous evening, had contemplated
killing herself by slitting her wrists, and that she had brought a knife to school in her
binder. Ratner took her binder and put it in his locker. Although he did not tell school
authorities, he allegedly intended to tell both his and her parents after school. By
lunchtime that same day, Roberta Griffith, Assistant Principal, had learned o f the knife.
Kellogg, Dean, believed that Ratner acted in the best interest of the girl and that
Ratner did not pose a thereat to harm anyone with the knife. Nonetheless, Ratner was
suspended by Griffith for ten-days for possessing a knife on school grounds in violation
of school board policy. Four days later the Principal affirmed the suspension with written
notice and two days after that Edgar Hatrick, Superintendent, informed Ratner that he
was being suspended indefinitely pending further action by the school board, which
ultimately became a suspension for the remainder of the school term which ended
February 1, 2000. Ratner’s parents requested and received the hearing before the school
district’s Discipline Committee to appeal, but that committee unanimously approved
Ratner’s long-term suspension. Subsequently, Ratner v. Loudoun was heard in the
Fourth Circuit Court o f Appeals in 2001.
Holding
The Court dismissed Ratner’s complaint for failure to state a claim of due process
violations.
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Rationale o f Holding
Ratner’s complaint asserted that his suspension under zero tolerance policy
amounted to violations o f his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Board policy in such cases
began with a presumption that offending students will be expelled but allowed school
officials discretion, “to such lesser disciplinary action, including long-term suspension, as
may be deemed appropriate.” The Court dismissed Ratner’s complaint for failure to sate
a claim o f due process violations. The District Court also concluded, correctly, that the
school officials gave Ratner constitutionally sufficient, even if imperfect, process in the
various notices and hearings it accorded him thereby, not only adhering but also
reaffirming Goss.
Dissenting/Concurring Opinions
However harsh the result in this case, the federal court was not called upon to
judge the wisdom o f a zero tolerance policy. Therefore the Court was limited to whether
Ratner’s complaint alleged sufficient facts which if proved would show that the
implementation o f the school’s policy failed to comport with the United States
Constitution. Judge Hamilton concurred and wrote the following which is presented in
part:
“I write separately to express my compassion for Ratner, his family, and common
sense. Each is the victim of good intentions run am uck... There is no doubt that
this zero-tolerance/automatic suspension policy...were adopted in large response
to the tragic school shootings that have plagued our nation’s schools over the past
several years....Here a young man, Ratner, took a binder containing a knife from
a suicidal fellow student in an effort to save her life.. .The facts do not offer even
the hint of a suggestion that Ratner ever intended to personally possess the knife
or harm anyone with it. ...Suffice it to say that the degree of Ratner’s violation of
school policy does not correlate with the degree of his punishment...But alas, as
the opinion for the court explains, this is not a federal constitutional problem.
(Ratner v. Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 2001 P. 146)”
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